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Abstract 
The use of Internet services and web applications has grown rapidly because of user 
demand. At the same time, the number of web application vulnerabilities has increased 
as a result of mistakes in the development where some developers gave the security 
aspect a lower priority than aspects like application usability. An SQL (structure query 
language) injection is a common vulnerability in web applications as it allows the 
hacker or illegal user to have access to the web application’s database and therefore 
damage the data, or change the information held in the database. This thesis proposes a 
new framework for the detection and prevention of new and common types of SQL 
injection attacks.  
The programme of research is divided in several work packages that start from 
addressing the problem of the web application in general and SQL injection in 
particular and discuss existing approaches. The other work packages follow a 
constructive research approach. The framework considers existing and new SQL 
injection attacks. The framework consists of three checking components; the first 
component will check the user input for existing attacks, the second component will 
check for new types of attacks, and the last component will block unexpected 
responses from the database engine.  
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Additionally, our framework will keep track of an ongoing attack by recording and 
investigating user behaviour. The framework is based on the Anatempura tool, a 
runtime verification tool for Interval Temporal Logic properties. Existing attacks and 
good/bad user behaviours are specified using Interval Temporal Logic, and the 
detection of new SQL injection attacks is done using the database observer component. 
Moreover, this thesis discusses a case study where various types of user behaviour are 
specified in Interval Temporal Logic and show how these can be detected.  
The implementation of each component has been provided and explained in detail 
showing the input, the output and the process of each component.  Finally, the 
functionality of each checking component is evaluated using a case study. The user 
behaviour component is evaluated using sample attacks and normal user inputs. This 
thesis is summarized at the conclusion chapter, the future work and the limitations will 
be discussed. 
This research has made the following contributions: 
 New framework for detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks. 
 Runtime detection: use runtime verification technique based on Interval Temporal 
logic to detect various types of SQL injection attacks. 
 Database observer: to detect possible new injection attacks by monitoring database 
transactions.  
 User’s behaviour: investigates related SQL injection attacks using user input, and 
providing early warning against SQL injection attacks. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
Objectives 
 
 Present an introduction and the scope of this research. 
 Identify the research problem statement and the motivation of this research. 
 Highlight the research objectives and the success criteria. 
 Provide the adopted methodology for this research.  
 Provide the thesis outline.  
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1.1. Background 
Web based applications are a very important part of the internet because it enables 
the transfer of data and services such as banking applications and governmental 
applications via the Internet. However, the big challenge of using these type of 
applications is how to increase the confidence of using these environments? And one 
of the most important points is securing these applications against various types of 
web application attacks. Web application vulnerabilities have been used to exploit 
and damage these applications, such as SQL injection, insecure cryptographic 
storage and XSS (Cross Site Scripting) etc. For example, Yahoo has been attacked in 
July 2012, and more than 400,000 users password and information are stolen (BBC 
2012). Another example is that, the hacking of the Nokia developer’s network in 
August 2011, the hacker stole personal information such as email, date of birth etc 
(BBC 2011). The exploited vulnerabilities in these examples were SQL injection. 
SQL injection vulnerabilities have been chosen to be investigated in this research. 
The following highlights the motivation of our selection.  
1.2. Motivation and Research Objectives 
Web application vulnerabilities are a big area of research as there are various types 
of them.  SQL (Structure Query Language) injection is a common and dangerous 
example (OWASP 2010, Clarke 2012). This vulnerability type allows the attacker to 
damage and steal the information of the web application. SQL injection attacks can 
be done using various techniques, some of them are manual based on the attacker 
experience in the structure of the web application and use of SQL commands, and the 
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other is automated using existing injection tools.  This research is one of many 
researches dealing with the SQL injection problem (Boyd, Keromytis 2004, Huang, 
Huang et al. 2003, Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006, Kemalis, Tzouramanis 2008, 
Kieyzun, Guo et al. 2009, Liu, Yuan et al. 2009). The existing approaches focus only 
on blocking SQL injection attacks using various techniques, such as static analysis 
that analyses the a source code of web application and determines the access points 
of application database (Fu, Lu et al. 2007), filtering user inputs that removes the 
injecting SQL keywords (Shrivastava, Bhattacharyji 2012) or runtime monitoring  
approach that monitor the user inputs (Halfond, Orso 2006). The existing approaches 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
The existing approaches consider SQL injection attacks to consist of a static run of 
one step, whereas we consider them to be dynamic and consisting of several steps. 
For example, if the attacker tries to inject a web application using SQL injection that 
requires at least three steps, the first step determines the database type, and the 
second step recognizes the database structure and the last step will exploit and 
damage the application. In addition, the existing approaches have developed 
detection techniques that can block existing attacks but cannot deal with new attacks. 
For example, static analysis approaches have been used to determine weak points in 
the application and this does not protect the application against new forms of attacks 
despite the protection is more important than detection. Moreover, the dynamic 
approaches are monitoring the user input looking for existing attacks, some of them 
check the sequence of SQL statements at runtime and others compare the SQL 
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statement structure derived from static analysis with those at runtime. Therefore, the 
problem statement for this research is: 
 The existing detection approaches are static and consider only one step attacks. 
 The detection technique should handle new type of attacks. 
  Thus, the research objectives can be summarized as follows: 
 Develop a novel technique to analyse the user input against SQL injection attacks 
that can deal with new attack patterns.  
 Develop a new approach to model the attack behaviour based on the user input.  
 Evaluate the result and compare the proposed approach with existing approaches.  
1.3. Research Question  
The question discussed in this research is as follows:  
How to detect new and existing SQL injection attack patterns and how to profile 
the attacker behaviour? 
A research programme has been proposed in section 1.5 to answer this question. 
1.4. Scope of the Research 
Several attack types can be used for damaging the underlying tier of a web 
application, these attacks can be done by exploiting one of the existing vulnerabilities 
of this application like XSS or insecure misconfiguration etc. This research focuses 
on the detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks that send HTTP requests to 
the application server. As aforesaid, there are many studies that tackle the problem of 
SQL injection attack, such static or dynamic analysis. This research focus on SQL 
injection attack for the following reasons: 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
     
 
 
5 
 SQL injection is classified in OWASP 2007 as second common security 
vulnerability of top ten vulnerabilities, and in 2010 and 2013 OWASP 
statistics it is classified as the most dangerous one (OWASP 2010, OWASP 
2013). 
 To deal with the web application vulnerabilities requires focussing on a 
specific type of web application vulnerabilities. 
The development language that is chosen for this research is PHP and the database 
type is MYSQL. Our section is based on the fact that PHP and MYSQL are free 
resources and they can be installed using one execution file like “WampServer” 
(Bourdon. 2013).  
1.5. Research Methodology 
This research follows a constructive research method (Iivari 1991).  We develop a 
new framework for the detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks that can 
detect new and existing attacks in addition to monitor ongoing attacks. The 
monitoring will be based on ITL (Interval Temporal Logic) and will use the 
Anatempura runtime verification tool.  Thus, our research programme consists of the 
following work packages: 
Work package 1: The research background and the related work. 
This work package starts with discussing the architecture and security of web 
applications, highlighting the type of hacking. It provides a summary of web 
application vulnerabilities. SQL injection vulnerabilities types will be discussed in 
detail with an illustrative example of each SQL injection type.  The SQL injection 
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techniques, i.e., manual or automated will be discussed in detail. The existing 
approaches for detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks will be discussed 
critically highlighting related work and motivating our approach.  
Work package 2: The framework architecture.  
This work package provides an overview of the proposed detection and prevention 
framework and presents the design, discussing its components including the input, 
the output and the process for each component. The architecture incorporates the 
monitoring tool Anatempura. Furthermore, the interaction between these components 
will be discussed.   
Work package 3: Implementation. 
In this work package the detection and prevention framework will be implemented. 
The implementation includes the attacks specification, the detection functions, new 
attacks detection procedures and the behavioural function for dealing with related 
attacks. 
Work package 4: The evaluation. 
This work package evaluates the effectiveness of the detection and prevention 
framework and its components, implemented in work package 3. The evaluation will 
test the checking components individually. The behavioural functions will be tested 
using a case study that involves sequences of user input.  The testing results will be 
analysed to measure the effectiveness of our framework.  This work package also 
contains a comparison between the proposed framework and existing approaches. 
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1.6. Success Criteria   
The success of this research will be measured according to its ability of answering 
the research question, in addition to achieve the research objectives. Thus, the 
success of this framework and its implementation will be judged according to 
following criteria:     
 The framework can detect and prevent existing SQL injection attack types.   
 The runtime verification tool is suitable for monitoring SQL injection attacks. 
 The framework can detect new types of SQL injection attacks.  
 ITL is suitable to model attack behaviour. 
1.7. Thesis Outline  
As mentioned in the previous sections, this chapter provides an introduction that 
discusses the motivation of this research and specifies the research problem and the 
scope of this research.  Moreover, the research aims and the success criteria have 
been highlighted. This thesis is organized as follows:  
 Chapter 2 introduces web applications and gives an overview of their 
architecture. Furthermore, it discusses the security of these applications and 
discusses several web application vulnerabilities in general. Moreover, this 
chapter discusses existing SQL injection attacks techniques. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of existing approaches for the detection and 
prevention of SQL injection attacks. 
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of temporal logic in general and ITL in 
particular, showing its syntax and semantics and presents a justification of our 
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selection of ITL. Tempura the executable subset of ITL will be discussed using 
examples. In addition, the Anatempura tool will be reviewed, discussing its 
features and architecture and its use in our framework.  
 Chapter 4 provides and discusses the detection and prevention framework and its 
architecture and components. Each component will be explained in detail, in 
addition the interaction between these components will be discussed.  This 
chapter will also give examples of attack behaviour. 
 Chapter 5 provides the implementation assumption and the implementation 
requirements and the reasons of this selection. It also presents the implemented 
functions and discusses how each component of our framework is implemented.  
 Chapter 6 provides the evaluation criteria and the results of testing each 
component of the framework. The results will be used to measure the 
effectiveness of each component of the framework.  This chapter also contains a 
comparison of our approach with existing approaches that tackle the problem of 
SQL injection attacks. 
 Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and discuss the proposed framework illustrating 
its limitations and strengths. It then revisits the success criteria of our research 
and then discusses future work. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
Background and Related Works 
Objective 
 Reviewing web application architecture. 
 Providing a summary of web application vulnerabilities. 
 Explaining the problem of SQL injection attacks in detail. 
 Discussing the existing approaches. 
 Highlighting the related work underpinning the motivation of our approach. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The security of web applications is a concern for many organizations such as banks, 
universities and other companies. To understand the security aspects of web 
applications requires being conversant with the basic knowledge of the architecture 
of web applications and the general process of the transformation of the data in a web 
application. This chapter provides in general the architecture and the main concept of 
web application, and it also discusses in detail the web application vulnerabilities, 
especially SQL injections. This chapter is divided and organized into several 
sections. Section 2.2 reviews the web application in general and highlights the web 
application architecture. Section 2.3 highlights the main concept of web application 
security describing the concept of hacking in general and its aims and types. Section 
2.4 defines the hacking of a web application and explains various types of web 
application vulnerabilities. Section 2.5 describes SQL injection techniques in detail. 
Section 2.6 discusses SQL injection automated attacks and some of the existing 
injection tools. Section 2.7 discusses the existing approaches that are proposed to 
address SQL injection vulnerabilities. Section 2.8 reviews the motivation of this 
research and highlights the research problem. Section 2.9 concludes and summarizes 
this chapter. 
2.2. Web Applications Review 
Due to rapid development of computer software and the Internet communications, 
the online services have been increased. There are many institutions that have made 
their services accessible via the Internet. Those institutions have various aims and 
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purposes depending on their activity, looking to attract the users to access their 
webpage to achieve the best return of their availability on the Internet.  
Consequently, the data and the services are normally placed in a web application. 
The web application is a software system can be accessed by the user over the 
Internet (Morley 2008). Another definition of web application is “any software 
application that depends on the Web for its correct execution” (Gellersen, Gaedke 
1999). Therefore, the previous definitions have agreed that a web application is an 
application or software that depends on the web environment.  Accordingly, the 
features of a web application are similar to features of the web, such as accessibility, 
availability, and scalability. The next section will specify the web application 
architecture. 
2.2.1. Web Application Architecture 
In general the web based application consists of three layers which are as follows: 
Logical layer, Middleware layer and Data layer as shown in Figure 1 (Woodger 
Computing Inc 2012). 
Figure 2.1 Architecture of Web Application 
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 Client layer: this layer is running in the user web browser and implements the 
user interface to allow the user to enter or change data according to the applications 
needs, and it allows the user to view the content of the web page as well.  The client 
layer uses two general techniques which are as follows: 
 Dump technique: with this technique, the application page has been built by 
using HTML code only. This type of pages can run with old versions of web 
browsers. However, there is no validation at these pages which means the data 
entry will be checked by the middle tier layer. Accordingly, if there is any error 
caught by the middle layer, the page will post it back to the user browser.    
 Semi-Intelligent technique: here the web page would be built by using Dynamic 
html and JavaScript in addition to HTML. These pages are more flexible than 
the dump technique and the developer can design the web page with some 
options and validations of a user input that can be executed on the client side.  
As the result, the developed page will be run with better performance. 
 Middle Tier: this layer generally consists of two layers which are the presentation 
layer and the business layer. The first one is for generating the web pages in addition 
to its dynamic content. The other task of this layer is for decoding the submitted 
pages that are coming as packets from the client who submitted these pages. Thus, 
this layer can extract the data that is submitted by the user and send this data to the 
business layer. The business layer is used to perform the logical part of the 
application such as the calculation, and user validation. Additionally, this layer is 
used to manage the application workflow and the access to the data layer.  
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 Data layer: this layer organizes and stores the data that is passed from the 
business layer and retrieves the data that is required from the business layer as well. 
Moreover, some data manipulation would be done in this layer. For example, the 
business layer requires specific data from data layer. So, the preparation stage to 
process the required data can be done in any layer whether business layer or data 
layer. Similarly, if the data manipulation requires a calculation or collection of data 
from multiple tables, then the database engine will process this request using the 
database procedures (Woodger Computing Inc 2012). 
The previous paragraphs described in general the web application layers; next we 
will review the security of web application.  
2.3. Web Application Security 
Web Applications allow various types of users to access the obtainable services. The 
permanent availability of web applications will increase the opportunity for everyone 
who is looking to exploit and damage these applications for illegal purposes. The 
people who are damaging a web application are commonly known as hacker or 
attacker, and the technique is called hacking (Morley 2008). The developers are 
working to implement a functional web application and they neglect the security side 
(Antunes, Laranjeiro et al. 2009). Consequently, many approaches have been 
developed to secure the web application against harmful attacks. Each approach is 
looking for the solution from a special perspective; some approaches are looking to 
secure the network, and other approaches to secure the application or the application 
server. Thus, to secure the web application one needs to start finding the problem 
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that requires a solution. The next sections will highlight the common security 
problems together with an explanation of the hacking aims and types. 
2.3.1. Hacking Definition  
Traditionally, the hacker notion was used to call anyone who explores or tries to 
learn how the computer system works. Currently, the hackers meaning has been 
changed because the objectives and the behaviour of the hacker has changed. The 
new meaning of hacker is the person who inserts malicious code to stop the system 
or to gain unauthorized access for personal or harmful purposes (Beaver 2007). 
2.3.1.1. Hacking Types 
In general, the hacking types can be classified according to the classification criteria 
that are used to distinguish between the hacking types. The first classification is from 
the ethical perspective, and there are two main types which are ethical and unethical, 
the ethical one is to perform testing for the application to find the weak points by 
using hacker techniques (Simpson, Backman et al. 2010). The unethical is gaining 
access for malicious aims such as damaging the application database. Another 
classification has done by (Beaver 2007) who classified hacking into several types 
according to the hacking target which are as follows: 
 Hacking a server by exploiting a unsecured port in the server. 
 Hacking a network by stealing data which is transferring via the network. 
 Hacking a personal computer by using unsecured ports or any other vulnerability 
like exploiting internet explorer vulnerabilities to steal personal information. 
 Hacking a web applications starting with exposing the applications vulnerability 
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and then exploiting it. 
Therefore, different types of hacking pose a threat to the web environment. 
Accordingly, the security of web applications depends on how to secure this 
application starting from the user computer to the application server.  
2.3.1.2. Hacking Aims 
The hacker’s aim can be predicted from the attacker intent and his target. However, 
there is no order that can determine who comes first. Thus, the hacking aims are 
important and can be used to determine the hacking reasons.  For example, the 
hacking of the data layer of a web application is aiming for multiple objectives 
 Rigging of the web data either by adding or modifying the data.  
 Stealing information by extracting the data. 
 Affect the web database performance by running database remote commands 
(Halfond, Viegas et al. 2006).   
Another example is, the network hacking which is a result of insufficient protection 
of the system network. The target here is the system network and some of the aims 
are 
 Monitoring the user data. 
 Stealing important information that is sent by the user. 
The mentioned examples show some of the common hacking aims which are related 
to hacking target. In other words, the attacker’s targets determine the attacker’s aims. 
2.4. Hacking Web Application 
As aforesaid, hacking in general is gaining unauthorized access to execute or achieve 
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illegal activities. This unauthorized access can be done by exploiting one or more of 
the web applications vulnerabilities. Therefore, the question here is what is a web 
application vulnerability? What types of vulnerabilities do exist?  The next sections 
will describe types of web application. 
2.4.1. Web Application Vulnerabilities 
The common threat against the security of web application is the widespread 
occurrence of different types of web application vulnerability. A vulnerability is a 
weak point or gap in the application which allows the malicious attacker to endanger 
the application stakeholders. The user, the owner and other objects that are 
depending on the application are considered to be stakeholders (OWASP 2011).   
There are several types of web application vulnerability; each one has special 
properties, such as the vulnerability style, the detection and prevention techniques. 
Figure 2.2 shows the statistics of OWASP (open web application security project) 
top ten vulnerabilities which have classified the percentage of the vulnerability that is 
used in the hacking of web application in 2010.  
 
 
The statistics have been conducted according to the number of exploiting the same 
 
Figure 2.2 OWASP Top 10 for 2010 
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vulnerability. Accordingly, the OWASP top ten 2010 vulnerabilities are as follows: 
  Injection:  
This type occurs when the attacker injects the application command or queries by 
untrusted data. The application interpreter will execute the injected command 
together with the normal command of the application. In this way, the application 
data will be affected by unauthorised accesses, as well as the execution of unintended 
commands. The common example of this type is SQL (structure query language), OS 
(operating system), and LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) injection. 
  Cross Site Scripting (XSS):  
This type happens as a result of poor validation of the untrusted data which is sent 
via the web application to the web browser. This vulnerability allows a harmful 
script to run at the victim’s computer. Moreover, these vulnerabilities can be 
classified in two categories which are the first order and the second order attacks. 
The first order one will be done by inserting script in application page or attract the 
victim to click on an infected URL that contains a malicious script. The second one 
is persistent as the attacker can store the malicious script in the application database 
and can run it permanently. As a result, the attacker can redirect the victim to other 
malicious sites (Kieyzun, Guo et al. 2009). 
  Broken Authentication and Session Management:  
This vulnerability allows the attacker to hijack the user session or password by 
compromising it, and using the hijacked information for harmful purposes like 
exploiting the session as another user. This vulnerability resides in the application as 
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a result of poor implementation of the authentication function.    
 Insecure Direct Object References:  
This vulnerability allows the attacker to direct the web application references to be 
used with other resources. In other words, it allows the attacker to gain unauthorised 
access of specific resources. This vulnerability is a developer’s mistake, because the 
exposed references of internal object like directory or file are exposed by the 
developer.  
 Cross Site Request Forgery:  
This type of attack allows the attacker to control the web browser of the victim’s 
computer forcedly, and they can generate requests and send them to the application 
as if the requests were sent from the victim.  
 Security Misconfiguration: 
This vulnerability is a result of misconfiguration between the system components or 
neglect of the last update of these components. Therefore, to avoid this type of 
vulnerability, the system requires a secure configuration for all components. The 
configuration must be done for system implementation and maintenance (do not use 
default security option). Moreover, all system software must be up to date starting 
from the OS to DBMS. For example, if there is a XSS flows in the components. The 
new update has fixed this problem at the application level but not in application 
library. These differences can be found easily by the attacker. 
 Insecure Cryptographic Storage: 
 The sensitive data in a Web application must be secure enough with suitable hashing 
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or encryption techniques to avoid attacks, such as stealing or modifying important 
data like credit card information or authentication credentials. Thus, if the attacker 
can gain unauthorized access to a web application databases, he cannot use the stored 
data as it is encrypted.  
 Failure to Restrict URL Access: 
Some developer lets URL application links point directly to some of the application 
pages.  Normally, the attackers are looking to find the hidden pages by changing the 
ULR address to access it. 
 For example, if the link of page is http://example.co.uk/webapp/mainpage and the 
attacker will manipulate the URL to http://example.co.uk/webapp/admin_page, then 
the attacker can gain unauthorised access to other pages. To avoid this vulnerability, 
the checking of URL access is required for each page of the web application.  
 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection:  
The web application transport protection is important to keep the data transport 
secure and protected. Many applications have used SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) or 
TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocols to protect the application data. This 
vulnerability is a result of weak protection of the transport layer like using expired 
certificates which are supplied by the SSL provider. For, example, if the network is 
not secured by SSL the attacker can monitor the network and see the victim’s session 
or cookies then the attacker can used the victim’s information through the user 
session.  
 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards: 
 One of the web browsing features allows the user to move through the web pages by 
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redirect or forward. With this moving, validation is required to be sure there is no 
wrong access for those pages and the redirected and forwarded pages are not 
changed. The attacker can change the victim’s destination pages to other malware 
sites (OWASP 2010). 
The mentioned vulnerabilities are the top ten of 2010, there are other vulnerabilities 
in a web application such as malicious file execution. Moreover, there are several 
studies and tools for the detection of the various types of web application 
vulnerabilities. The next section will highlight some of the scanning tools that are 
used to expose and determine those vulnerabilities.   
2.4.2. Web Application Vulnerabilities Scanning Tools 
Due to the increasing security risk in web applications which is the result of the 
spread of different type of vulnerabilities, there are many tools to scan those 
vulnerabilities such as Nikto, W3af, Skipfish, Acunetix and Appscan and others 
(Lyon 2011) ; some of these tools are as follows: 
 Nikto is a comprehensive solution of web application scanner that can find around 
3200 possibly unsafe points. Moreover, it is an open source tool and can be used with 
multiple types of application server as well as with multiple operating systems like 
Linux, and Windows. Moreover, this tool is frequently updated to handle the latest 
vulnerability (Sullo, Lodge 2012).  
 (Sullo, Lodge 2012)(Sullo, Lodge 2012)(Sullo, Lodge 2012)(Sullo, Lodge 
2012)Acunetix is a commercial scanning tool produced by Acunetix Company. This 
tool has many features in addition to being a web vulnerability scanner, such as 
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scanning a web server for unsecure ports. It uses an intelligent and fast crawler that 
can scan many pages with high performance in addition to detect the type and the 
application language of the web server automatically (Acunetix 2012).  
The mentioned tools are examples of tools that can detect and block various types of 
web application vulnerabilities. This research will explore one type of vulnerability 
which is the SQL injection vulnerability. The next section will describe SQL 
injection vulnerabilities.  
2.5. SQL Injection 
SQL injection is a common vulnerability used for hacking web application databases 
by executing a malicious SQL code injected by the attacker.  It also has been 
classified as the first dangerous vulnerability regarding to OWASP statistics 
(OWASP 2010). Moreover, the problem of this type of attack is that it cannot be 
handled or controlled by a firewall or other communication security approaches 
which are used in the prevention of network hacking. Because the attackers using 
this type of vulnerability can gain access to the web application through the http 
protocol (Fu, Lu et al. 2007).   
2.5.1. SQL Injection Technique and Examples 
To serve the user at a website, user information is required. Accordingly, web 
applications usually provide a login page containing two text fields to allow the user 
to enter his user name and password. After the user entry, the data will be submitted 
and the user information will be sent to the web application database to check the 
user information. By submitting the user data, this data will be sent to the web 
 Chapter 2 - Background and Related Works 
 
 
 
 
22 
application database using the following SQL statement: 
Select  * from UserTable where username= “user_entry_name” and userpassword   
=”user_entry_password”   
When this SQL statement is executed, the system will return the result of the query.  
If the user data is valid then the web application permits the user to access other 
pages at the website or the user input will be rejected and the login page reloads 
again.  However, there is another scenario which is if the user enters the following 
code at the user name field (user name or ‘1’=’1’ - -) then the SQL statement will be 
like the following: 
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE username = “user name ‘ or ‘1’=’1’ # “  
At this stage the database engine considers any code after WHERE as a conditional 
statement, and when the database interpreter find “or 1=1 – “, the check condition is 
always equal to true. Moreover, any code or condition after the double dash will be 
ignored.  Consequently, the attacker will have unauthorized access to this web 
application. 
This last example is a highlight of one the Tautology query or Tautology based SQL 
injection attack (Halfond, Viegas et al. 2006, Fu, Lu et al. 2007, Kim 2010). This 
attack type is done by injecting the web application with a command statement that 
usually returns true. There are more SQL injection attack types which will be 
discussed in the next section. There is also a clarifying example for each type. 
2.5.2. SQL Injection Classification 
According to (Halfond, Viegas et al. 2006)  there are different types of SQL injection 
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techniques. Each type can be done in isolation or in combination. This depends on 
the attacker’s experience, aims and behaviour. In this section various types of SQL 
injection attacks will be discussed. In addition, for each type there is an illustrative 
example. 
2.5.2.1. Tautology Query 
The example in the introduction was a tautology query attack. In this technique the 
condition statements usually return true or are evaluated to true.  When the attacker 
injects the condition statements of the web application query by malicious code, the 
attacker is aiming to keep the value of condition statements equal to true. This 
technique usually uses the login page to inject the login field with “or 1=1”.   
2.5.2.2. Piggy-Backed Query 
The purpose of this type of attack is to inject the original query with an additional 
query.  All queries will be executed in sequence starting with the original one. This 
attack is different from others because the attackers are not changing or editing the 
original query, they are just attempting to add new queries and attach them to the 
original one. Accordingly, the database engine will receive more than one query, the 
first query will executed as normal then the second or others will be executed next. 
Consequently, if the second query was executed successfully, the attackers can 
execute and inject any SQL command such as stored procedures or any other 
command.  This vulnerability type normally needs a special database engine 
configuration to allow the attacker to execute harmful SQL commands. In other 
words, the database engine configuration allows the database system to execute 
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single string including multiple command statements. For example, suppose that the 
following code “ ; drop table UserTable - - ” has been  inputted at the login field of 
the login system page. The scenario will be as follows: 
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE username = ‘ any ;DROP TABLE UserTable - - ‘AND 
userpassword =’  user_entry_password’  
After submitting the login page the web application will send this information to the 
database engine. Then, the database engine will run the login query as routine. As the 
query is executed the database engine will find the query delimiter “;” or semi 
comma, so the database will execute the injected code by default. At this stage the 
user table will be dropped and the system will lose the user data. Another example is, 
suppose that the database type was an MS-SQL database, and the attacker injects the 
vulnerable parameter with the SHUTDOWN command. Therefore, the scenario will 
be as follows: 
 
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE username = ‘user_entry_name‘ AND userpassword =’ ; 
SHUTDOWN --   user_entry_password’  
The database engine will execute the query starting to execute the first part of the 
query and return null, and then the second part of the query which includes the 
injected command. Consequently, the injected command will shut down the database 
(Stuttard, Pinto 2011). One more example is, if the attacker injects the query with a 
statement to insert user data in above scenario. At this stage the attacker can add 
wrong information to the database system. Note that there are differences between 
databases engine to separate the queries. Accordingly, the good way to detect and 
prevent this type of attack is using an effective technique for validation of the user 
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entry at runtime by scanning and analysing queries to find query separations, as well 
as a correct (safe) database configuration (Lee, Jeong et al. 2012, Kim 2010). 
2.5.2.3. UNION Query 
The idea behind the union query attack is similar to the other SQL injection types; 
the attackers are looking for a vulnerable parameter and try to exploit it by changing 
the data set which is returned for a submitted query. In addition, by using this 
technique the application will receive different results from the database instead of 
the one programmed by the developer. This technique starts with injecting the 
vulnerable parameter using the UNION SELECT keyword, so the attacker can 
control the second query to obtain the database information. Moreover, data will be 
available from any table and the attacker can just choose which data he/she wants or 
from any specific table. Referring to the last example, if the attacker injects the 
submitting query at student login page as follows: 
UNION SELECT StudentName ,StudentId,StudentPass from Students where StudentId =’P07013000’ 
 
Therefore the submitted query will be like the following: 
 
SELECT * FROM StudentTable WHERE StudentName = ‘StudentID’ AND StudentPass =’ any‘ 
UNION SELECT StudentName ,StudentId,StudentPass from Students where StudentId =’P07013000’ 
 
At this stage, the database engine will execute the first query and return null, and 
then it will execute the second query and returned the student data including the 
login information. Consequently, the attacker has unauthorised access to the system 
and can change or edit any student data. Note that there are previous attack steps 
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using other SQL injection attack types to let the attacker know the database structure 
before starting with this technique such as an illegal query attack (Anley 2002, Spett 
2002, Fu, Lu et al. 2007, Halfond, Orso 2006). 
2.5.2.4. Logically Incorrect Query 
Logically Incorrect Query or illegal query is an SQL injection attack type used at the 
early stage of an attack to gather information about the database such as database 
type, table columns and column type or others. In this type of attack the input is a 
logically false statement to cause a database error response like adding 2=1 to the 
condition statement. Therefore, this technique is usually started by injecting the 
vulnerable parameter of webpage with an incorrect command (logically) to produce 
an error from the database engine. Moreover, this technique can be used as a blind 
injection and the attacker can monitor the web application response. Thus, the 
attacker can obtain the feedback from the database engine according to that error. For 
example, if the injection code is as follows: 
SELECT user FROM UsersTable WHERE username=’’ or 1 = convert ( int, (select 
top 1 name from sysobjects where xtype=’u’)) ; -- AND userpass=’’ 
The attacker here tampers the input by providing different data type in the condition 
statement that is not compatible with the system column data type. Thus, if the 
injected parameter is valuable the database engine responses to this input by 
returning error feedback message that allows the attacker to do further steps to 
retrieve data from this database. (Wang, Phan et al. 2010, Spett 2003, Yeole, 
Meshram 2011, Halfond, Viegas et al. 2006). 
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2.5.2.5. Stored Procedures 
This SQL injection attack technique is used to run or create stored procedures which 
are used by the database engine. The stored procedure is usually used by the 
developer or the database administrator to control the database and to take advantage 
of the database facilities, such as database access or database services. The stored 
procedures are not similar to each other, i.e., Oracle database are not similar to 
MYSQL or MS-SQL database. Thus, the attacker needs to determine the database 
type to exploit this vulnerability. Therefore, the attacker could start with a logically 
incorrect query attack type to determine the database type, and then the attacker can 
use the stored procedure attack. For example, if the developer prepares the login 
condition statement as follow: 
 
SELECT @sql_procedure = ‘ SELECT LoginId , LoginPassword  from UserTable 
where LoginId=”+ @userlogin  + AND LoginPassword =”+@password +”  
EXEC (@sql_procedure) 
 
In this case the use of a stored procedure @ sql_procedure provides a way to the 
attacker to harm the database of the application as the login values have direct access 
to this database. (Manikanta, Sardana 2012, Santosh 2006) 
2.5.2.6. Inference Query 
This attack technique is used when the attacker is not able to get any interactive 
message via an injection command.  Therefore, the attackers are looking to find other 
ways to expose the website vulnerability. The attacker here estimates a web 
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application response by injecting it with different SQL keywords till he/she gains the 
required information from the database to start his attack. This type of attack is 
generally divided into the following sub types. 
2.5.2.6.1. Blind Injection Inference 
In this technique, the attackers inject the web page with a condition statement to help 
them to infer the database layout through evaluating the response of the database 
engine with the inject condition statement, whether the statement is true or false. At 
this stage, the system will continue working normally if the statement evaluates to 
true. Consequently, if the injected statement evaluates to false, the web page will not 
return an error message. However, the web page will not work normally, i.e., there 
are differences between the page behaviour before the injection statement and after. 
Therefore, the attacker here will gather the information by comparing the results of 
the response from queries with true or false injected command injection. (Spett 2003, 
Tajpour, Masrom et al. 2010) 
2.5.2.6.2. Timing Inference Query 
In this technique, the attacker injects queries with a malicious command to make a 
system delay. Then the attacker will observe the reaction from the web application 
by monitoring the response time and collect information about the database 
according to this response.  If there is a delay then the injected statement or 
command runs successfully, otherwise the statement execution has failed and the 
attacker needs to alter the injected statement. Consequently, there are various ways to 
inject the web application using this type of attack such as using a delay function; the 
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next example will clarify the attack technique. If the database type is Ms-SQL and 
the attacker injects a field of the web application by adding WAITFOR function then 
the SQL statement will be like the following: 
SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE username = ‘WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:20'-- 
‘AND userpassword =’user_entry_password’  
 
Or with MYSQL the attacker can add the following code to the vulnerable variable  
' union select benchmark( 22500, sha1( 'test' )) ss, ee from test1 where '1'='1 
If the injected field is vulnerable to injection then the injected code will make a delay 
for 20 second till the end of function execution. So, the attacker will observe this 
delay and knows the injected field is vulnerable to injection and usable for other 
injection attack. The WAITFOR function does not work with Oracle database which 
has other code to achieve same delay like “dbms_lock.sleep(20); ”. 
Therefore, the attacker will try several attempts considering different database types 
(Clarke 2012, Yeole, Meshram 2011, Tajpour, Masrom et al. 2010).  
2.5.2.7. Alternate Encoding 
Normal attack techniques look for known characters or keywords which are usually 
called bad characters. In this technique, the attackers escape from the normal 
detection approaches by using injected text that uses alternate encoding. The 
alternate encoding uses injected text encoded in ASCII, Unicode or hexadecimal. 
Thus, the attack aims cannot be determined, so the attacker can use more than one 
encoding technique. Therefore, during the application development the developer 
should secure the web application against this type of attack by using effective 
technique that considers various possibilities of malicious encoding text to prevent 
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this type of attack. For example, if the attacker injects the user login field with the 
following string exec(char(0x73687574646f776e)) - - , the query statement that is 
sent for execution  by the database engine will be as follows: 
SELECT * FROM StudentTable WHERE StudentName = ‘StudentID ; 
exec(char(0x73687574646f776e))--’ AND StudentPass =’Studentpassword’  
At this stage, the database engine will execute the mentioned query by using the char 
function which is built in the database engine. Note that the char function changes 
the character style of encoding keyword to be in the actual style of character.  So, the 
injected encoded text that mentioned before is working similar to shutdown 
command, and when the attacker inject the web page by this encoded text the 
database system will stop working. Therefore, this attack technique is not the same as 
the attack in previous sections because the effective prevention against this type will 
need to consider all possible injected encodings that could be harmful to the web 
application (Howard, LeBlanc 2009, Halfond, Viegas et al. 2006). 
2.5.2.8. Inline Comments 
This SQL injection attack can be used with all of the previous attacks technique as 
the attacker can divide the injection command using the inline comment 
programming feature. This technique can support the attacker to elude from the 
primitive detection and prevention techniques that are looking for a specific 
character. For example: if the attacker uses the tautology techniques as follows: 
Select * from users where username = ‘or ‘1’=’1 and password =’ any word ’ 
This query can be divided using in line comment as follow: 
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Select * from users where username = ‘or /* hi */ ‘1’=/* no */’1 and password … 
Another example if the attacker combine alternate encode with in line comment as 
follow: 
Select * from users where username = ‘or % 00  /* hi */ ‘1’=’1 and password … 
The attacker here injects the null character and in line comment to the original query 
using the tautology attacks techniques (Clarke 2012, Howard, LeBlanc 2009). 
As aforesaid, there are different types of SQL injection attack vulnerability. This 
classification of SQL injection is useful as it helps the developer to detect and fix the 
SQL injection vulnerabilities during the application development stage. The other 
useful way to detect SQL injecting vulnerabilities is determining all possible 
injection ways to know how these vulnerability types could be exploited. The next 
section will highlight some of the attack methods that are used with SQL injection. 
2.6. Automated SQL Injection Attacks 
In general, the injection techniques can be summarised in two main categories, the 
first one is the manual technique which can be done using the mentioned attacks 
types that are discussed in the previous section. Success of this injection type 
depends on the attacker’s experience and the security level of the target web 
application. The detection techniques used to detect this type of attacks depend on 
the detection of the user input, or in other words it depends on the detection of the 
injection paths which can be summarised as follows: 
 Inputting data by using a parameter 
 Inputting data by manipulating URL 
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 Inputting data by using hidden field 
 Inputting data by tampering the http header 
 Inputting data by poisoning the application cookies (Livshits, Lam 2005). 
The other type of the injection attacks are automated SQL injection using one of the 
existed injection tools that are used to attack web application. In the next section 
some of these tools will be discussed.  
2.6.1. SQL Injection Tools 
Several automated injection tools have been used for attack, as a tool is easier to use 
than the manual attack, the attacker just gives the basic information that is required 
by the tool and waits till the tool retrieves the attack result whether it is successful or 
not. Many tools have been created; some of them are primitive tools and only can be 
used to attack specific database or to execute a prepared injection procedure. Other 
tools can attack any database type and can be used to execute different injection 
attacks.   
 One of the primitive tools is SQLdict which can be used with MS SQL server only. 
This tool needs some values to start, the IP address and the SQL account of the 
victim in addition to loading of a password dictionary. If the injection attack runs 
successfully, the tool returns the password of this account.  
Figure 3 shows an example of how an SQL account ‘sa’ is attacked by the SQLdict 
tool; the tool has returned the password value of this account. 
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 The weakness of this tool is that it is limited to one database engine type and it can 
only search for the password of known SQL accounts in the password dictionary that 
is loaded by the tool (SQLdict Tool 2008).  
 
Another SQL injection tool is SQLIer which can be used to attack MYSQL type of 
database. In general, this tool attacks a vulnerable URL and tries to find out some 
information about vulnerable components to create an SQL injection template and 
start exploiting it.  The common use of this tool is to find the password of the 
database based on the Union query attack. SQLIer runs using the following 
command:  
sqlier [option like –u for username , -o to crack password to file, ..etc ] [URL].  
This tool is better than SQLdict tool as there is no dictionary to find the password in. 
Figure 2.3 SQLdict Tool 
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However, both tools are still primitive as they can only be used for injection of 
specific database type and execute specific injection attack (SQLIer 2006).  
One of the more sophisticated SQL injection tools is SQLmap as it has many features 
that can be summarized as follows: 
 Can attack different type of databases like Oracle, MYSQL, etc. 
 Support different types of SQL injection techniques such as blind injection, 
Union query and others. 
 Searching for specific database name, table or column and finds the relevant 
name that contains a string of user name and password. 
 Establishing an interaction channel between the attacker pc and the DB server 
using TCP connection (SQLmap 2012). 
Use of the SQLmap tool is similar to the previous tool as it needs some information 
to starts like the target server address. Then, it can start attacks or test the web 
application for SQL injection vulnerable components. However, SQLmap has more 
features and better performance and it is not limited to one database type like the 
primitive tools.   
There are also many other tools like SQLSmack for MYSQL and OracSec for 
oracle database, each one has its advantage and limitation depending on the type and 
environment of use.   
The mentioned tools have been produced as result of many studies for the detection 
of vulnerable components of web applications. Moreover, before discussing these 
studies an important point should be discussed which is the false positives and false 
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negatives problem in the detection result. The next section will highlight those points 
in addition to clarifying the differences between them. 
2.6.2. False Positive and False Negative 
False positives are “when a tool reports incorrectly that a vulnerability exists, when 
in fact one does not”. Differently, the false negatives are “when a tool does not report 
that a vulnerability exists, when in fact one does” (Clarke 2012). Therefore, the most 
dangerous types of the checking result are false negatives. Some of the existing 
studies measure the success of their approaches by checking the percentage or the 
rate of the false positives and the false negatives in their result as one of the 
evaluating criteria. For example, (Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006) mentioned that 
there are no false positives produced by their checking model, (Halfond, Orso 2005) 
said that their approach only produced false positives in two cases and they have 
specified those cases. Thus, if there is a high rate of false positives or negatives in a 
specific study comparing with other studies that means the technique of the study 
that have less numbers of false positives or negatives is more accurate than the other 
one.  
In the next sections the different types of existing detection techniques will be 
highlighted. 
2.7. Detection and Prevention Existing Approach 
Many studies have been conducted for the detection and prevention against web 
application vulnerabilities in general and SQL injection vulnerabilities in particular; 
these studies have discussed the detection and prevention techniques from different 
point of views and using different techniques. Some of them used static techniques 
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which are used during development time by analysing the web application code to 
detect the injectable point in the application such as (Xie, Aiken 2006, Fu, Lu et al. 
2007, Gould, Su et al. 2004). There are other techniques that use both dynamic and 
static techniques by monitoring the user input at runtime such as (Halfond, Orso 
2006, Huang, Yu et al. 2004). The next sections will discuss these types of detection 
and prevention techniques. 
2.7.1. Controlling the User Input 
The available entry fields of a web application can be considered as a gate in front of 
the attacker. Several suggestions have been proposed to control the user input such as  
 Determining the size of text input, if the attacker tries to inject a union attack query 
in the login field and this field size is ten characters, the attacker cannot inject this 
field.  
 Character replacement: remove some of the common characters that can be used in 
the injection like semi comma. 
 Input validation, by validating the input value that is entered by the user 
(Hoffmeyer, Wang 2003).  
2.7.2. Scanning Tools Using Black Box Testing Approaches 
These approaches use two main steps for gathering the information about the weak 
points in the web application.  The first step detects the application workflow using a 
web crawler to find the vulnerable points. The second step generates an attack and 
monitors the applications behaviour. This technique has been called black box testing 
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as the scanning tools do not examine the source code of web application directly but 
they try to generate special input and simulate it with this application. 
(Kals, Kirda et al. 2006) have developed Secubat which is an open source tool that 
can scan a web application to detect the vulnerable points. This tool has a graphical 
user interface that gives the user flexibility to run the testing process. This tool has 
three components which are a crawler, attack generator, and the analyser. The 
crawler determines the link tree of the application pages including a web form fields 
starting from the root web address. The crawler in this approach based on a queued 
workflow system which improves its efficiency as it can run several concurrent 
worker threads. Moreover, Secubat tests a web application by injecting single quote 
for each form field and reports a web application response. The pages response result 
will be analysed by the analyser. 
(Huang, Huang et al. 2003) also have proposed a black box testing technique called 
the WAVES scanning tool. It is also an open source scan tool based on a web crawler 
supported by a parser engine that uses a DOM (Document Object Model) parser 
(W3C 2009)  to provide a comprehensive description of the web application 
components. The attack generator will use the crawler’s result to inject a web 
application fields with a prepared SQL injection pattern. The attack generator’s result 
will depend on a web application response and output. The WAVES tool uses a 
machine learning technique to enhance and improve its attack generator 
methodology. 
These approaches are useful as they provide a report that shows a web application’s 
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security level, but they have the same problem as other black box testing approaches 
in that they cannot provide a comprehensive solution as effective as to white box 
testing.   
2.7.3. Scanning Tools Using White Box Testing Approaches 
The white box testing or static analysis approaches are based on analysing the 
internal code of a web application and its structure to detect the vulnerable points at 
compilation time. Several attempts have been made to check a web application for 
SQL injection vulnerabilities using the white box testing approach, some of them 
will be highlighted in the following:  
(Gould, Su et al. 2004) has proposed the JDBC Checker which is a tool that can 
check statically for type correct queries in the SQL statement that are generated 
dynamically in Java. This technique detects only the SQL injection vulnerabilities 
that are based on type mismatches like logical incorrect query attacks, because it 
checks only the syntax of SQL statement for errors, but SQL injection attacks can be 
syntactically true and it does not return database errors.   
(Xie, Aiken 2006) uses an analysis algorithm to analyse open source PHP web 
applications statically for SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities. This approach 
employs analysis to detect and handle vulnerable components of PHP code and other 
scripting languages that are used to develop the application pages.  The authors run 
the analysis in three steps. The first step converts all application functions into blocks 
and summarizes these blocks by determining the variables and their location, the 
block programming language and the variables flow. The second step is an 
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intraprocedural analysis to detect the errors and the return set for each block. The 
third step is an interprocedural analysis to identify block conditions, such as, whether 
the block has a variable that must be sanitized before running this block. Thus, the 
vulnerable components will be detected by simulating these blocks using the analysis 
result. This approach cannot handle inline comment injection attacks and reports a 
high number of false positives. 
The SAFELI framework is one of the white box analysis techniques proposed by 
(Fu, Lu et al. 2007) to analyse ASP.NET applications. SAFELI consists of several 
components; one of the main components is MSIL (Microsoft Intermediate 
Language) Instrumentor which is used to manipulate the application byte code by 
inserting additional functions for each access point of the application database and 
replace its variables with symbolic constraints. The output of this component will be 
scanned with a second component called a symbolic execution engine that maps the 
whole application pages and its entry points and examines these points for pre 
collected information about attack patterns called attacks library. Thus, the 
examination results report the application’s vulnerabilities. However, this approach 
detection is limited as it is based on the existing vulnerabilities that are identified in 
the attacks library. 
In general, static analysis approaches are required to be more accurate for detecting 
security vulnerabilities, because they report a high number of false positives in the 
analysis reports (Livshits, Lam 2005). Moreover, applying these approaches for 
different host languages requires time and extensive effort due to the differences of 
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the structure of these languages (Bravenboer, Dolstra et al. 2007). 
2.7.4. SQL Randomisation Approach 
The main idea of this approach is adding numbers to each SQL keyword that are 
used in the query statement of the application. These numbers are integer numbers 
generated randomly. Then, during the execution of the application it will rewrite the 
SQL statements using a proxy filter and by adding a random number to the SQL 
keyword. Therefore, when the attacker tries to inject the application with any SQL 
keyword the system will reject them due to the missing random number (Boyd, 
Keromytis 2004, Kc, Keromytis et al. 2003).  However, the problem of this approach 
is that if the attacker can determine the random number the application can be 
attacked.  
2.7.5. Filtering Input (String Analysis) approaches 
This technique is based on filtering from the input data the malicious SQL keywords 
that can be used to attack the database system. (Scott, Sharp 2002)  has developed a 
proxy filter for the web application that can enforce the validation rule to check user 
input.  Filtering data in this approach uses three components; the first one is the 
validation constraints specification using SPDL (security policy description 
language) in addition to the specification of the transformation rule. The second 
component is a policy compiler which compiles these specifications for execution on 
a security gateway component.  The security gateway validates the specification 
rules on a web server by checking all http requests before sending it to the 
application database. However, this approach requires many technical specifications 
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to be done by the developer as described in (Scott, Sharp 2002). 
(Shrivastava, Bhattacharyji 2012) propose a protection and detection technique based 
on filtering the user input, they have generated a two level filtration model. The first 
one is an active guard which builds a susceptibility detector that can block any 
malicious characters that could be used to attack the web application database.  The 
active guard runs blocking procedures that compare a user input with an existing list 
of common malicious characters. The second one is a service detector which is used 
to validate a user input. This approach can block all the existing types of SQL 
injection attacks using a function called ‘killChars’. The drawback of this function is 
that the function removes several characters that can be used for normal writing 
without an extra checking of using these characters. Thus, it likely to report a high 
number of false positives.    
2.7.6. Taint data Approaches 
These approaches start with a static analysis that identifies hotspots or sensitive 
points in the web application which are any point that can be used by the application 
to access the application database. The other step is tracking the data that comes 
through these hotspots. Examples of these approaches will be highlighted in the 
following:  
(Livshits, Lam 2005) proposed an approach to find Java Tainted Objects. They are 
using static analysis consisting of two steps. The first step determines the security 
flow of a web application using a context-sensitive analysis technique (Whaley, Lam 
2004) which represents many program contexts using BDDs (Binary decision 
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diagrams). The BDDs will be translated using bddbddb tool into BDDs–based 
implementation that can be accessed as a Datalog queries.  The second step uses the 
PQL tool (Martin, Livshits et al. 2005) that can detect the application vulnerable 
components using the result of first step, and thus reports the application 
vulnerabilities in addition to its specification using a program query language. The 
drawback of this approach is that during the information flow analysis, any SQL 
query that receives data from the user will be considered a false positive 
vulnerability. For example, the function ‘executeQuery’ is a common sink function 
used by a Java application to execute an SQL statement and thus retrieves the data 
from the application database. According to the flow analysis, if the system finds any 
taint string or data that is passed to this function the system will consider it a unsafe 
point and thus the application is vulnerable. The problem of this approach is that it 
reports a high number of false positives. 
Also (Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006)  have proposed another detection technique 
implementing by the Pixy tool (Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006) which is a prototype 
written in Java that can analyse a PHP application statically. This analysis technique 
is based on data flow analysis to find the taint points of a web application. However, 
the analysis result shows that there is a rate of 50% of false positives.  
(Wassermann, Su 2007) proposed another technique that can analyse a PHP 
application statically in two steps. The first one uses context free grammars  
(Thiemann 2005)  to specify the syntactic structure for all SQL statements of the 
application.  The second step determine and retain the where SQL query will be 
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constructed. The second step results will be labelled to “direct” for the data that 
comes for the user, or “indirect” if the data comes from another resources like the 
database.  This approach reported low numbers of false positive.  
2.7.7. Static and Dynamic Approaches 
The main idea of these approaches is finding the sensitive point by analysing the web 
application code using a static analysis technique to detect the vulnerable 
components. Then, these vulnerable components will be instrumented with a runtime 
protection guard to ensure that the submitted data to the application is secure. The 
following will highlight some of these approaches.  
(Huang, Yu et al. 2004) have developed the WebSSARI tool that employs a detection 
algorithm based on the analysis method of the application information flow to detect 
the sensitive function that can be tainted in a PHP application. This tool has been 
supported by a runtime guard that can run an extra checking for sensitive functions 
that are found by the static analysis. In addition to the static analysis, a runtime guard 
is added that depends on the annotations that are provided by the user. The runtime 
guard filters the submitted user input from any SQL Keyword that can be injected in 
this input.  However, the result of the first step static analysis reports a high number 
of false negatives and false positives (Xie, Aiken 2006) .  
(Halfond, Orso 2006) developed AMNESIA (Analysis and Monitoring for 
Neutralizing SQL Injection Attacks) tool that can be used for the detection and 
prevention of SQL injection attacks. This tool combines two techniques which are 
static analysis and runtime monitoring. The static analysis procedure builds an SQL 
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query model using JSA (Java string analysis) (Christensen, Møller et al. 2003) that 
determines the construct queries points which have direct access to the database and 
specifies the sequence of tokens of that query. Successively, the other step is runtime 
monitoring which investigate all queries before they are sent to the database. This 
investigation checks the constructs queries at runtime and compares them against any 
of the existing attacks.  The runtime monitoring specifically checks the sequence of 
tokens that are specified by SQL query model, thus if the monitoring step finds that 
the query matches with no previous sequence the query will be prohibited accessing 
the database. This technique consists of two steps, and the limitation is the 
monitoring step that depends on the result of static analysis step. For example, in a 
hard-coded string ( like null character %00) there is a mismatch between SQL query 
model and the runtime monitoring as the last one looks for the original keywords and 
cannot catch a hard-coded string that is recognized by the SQL query model. 
(Kemalis, Tzouramanis 2008) have also proposed a monitoring technique based on a 
detection algorithm that specifies the syntactic structure for all SQL statements of the 
application through several phases. These phases describe each SQL statement of the 
application using a lexical analyser (Kodaganallur 2004) to determine the sequence 
of SQL keywords in these statements. The monitoring step checks if there is any 
SQL code injected in a specific SQL statement based on the specification of this 
SQL statement, and thus blocks unsafe SQL statements from the execution on the 
database.  
(Lam, Martin et al. 2008) improves their previous approach (Livshits, Lam 2005) 
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which uses a static analysis technique based on information flow (explained in 
Section 2.7.6). In their improvement, they add a dynamic error recovery which is a 
runtime monitoring technique based on PQL specification that is described in the 
static analysis step. This monitor is added to recover some cases that generate errors 
during the static analysis. The monitor compares the sequence of query contents of a 
specific query with its PQL specification, if there is a difference between them this 
query will be prohibited from the execution on the database.  
(Lee, Jeong et al. 2012) use a combination of static and dynamic techniques by 
removing any of the SQL attribute value of the SQL query at runtime and compare it 
with a static SQL query. They use Paros (Paros 2004) which is a scanning tool that 
can perform the static analysis of an application to detect the vulnerable points and 
describe the syntactic structure of these points. The dynamic step performs the 
monitoring of the input by applying a detection algorithm that can filter the input 
from any malicious code based on the static analysis results. However, this static 
analysis is based on the Paros tool and the last update of Paros was in 2004.     
(Manikanta, Sardana 2012) propose a similar technique that starts by analysing all 
application URL links to detect the vulnerable parameters and the injection points of 
the application using w3af which is a static analysis tool (Riancho 2012). The next 
step generate legitimate SQL queries based on the previous step results.  The 
legitimate SQL queries are all valid application queries that can be run. The 
monitoring step uses GreenSQL (GreenSQL LTD 2012) as a database firewall or 
front-end to database that can protect the application database against SQL injection. 
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GreenSQL monitors legitimate SQL queries and rejects any attacks and reports 
attack attempts. The author here combines between two existing solutions to achieve 
the best result of protection system. However, the GreenSQL does not support 
protection for Oracle database types.  
The previous discussed various methods that can detect and prevent SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. This research is similar to one of the mentioned techniques which are 
the detection of SQL injection at runtime by monitoring user input. The next section 
discusses some of the existing approaches including this research and highlights the 
contribution of this research.  
2.8. Motivation Revisited 
Many tools have been used to monitor systems at runtime. Some of these approaches 
have been highlighted in the previous sections. Some of the existing monitoring 
approaches have checked the order of SQL keywords in a SQL statement at runtime 
comparing that to the order that is determined by the static analysis using JSA 
(Halfond, Orso 2006).  Other researchers developed a technique using java 
monitoring to compare the syntactic structure of SQL statements using static analysis 
with its structure at runtime (Kemalis, Tzouramanis 2008).  
 Additionally, some of the monitoring do not require static analysis, they just run at 
runtime only like (Natarajan, Subramani 2012) that propose some specification for 
detection policies and apply their detection algorithm.  As aforesaid, some 
researchers focus on SQL injection attacks as a static run in one state; so they just try 
to block the attacker injection attempts (Antunes, Laranjeiro et al. 2009, Fu, Lu et al. 
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2007, Lee, Jeong et al. 2012, Kim 2010, Boyd, Keromytis 2004). 
However, the attacks are dynamic as they run over several steps such as, finding the 
vulnerable item, detecting the database type and exploring the database structure. 
Thus, the detection technique can be improved if there are scenarios that show the 
injection stages of web application as the detection procedure can predict the next 
step of the attack. Moreover, some of the existing approaches can only block some of 
the existing attacks they detect specific injection type because they are not effective 
to prevent several types like (Natarajan, Subramani 2012), and another one can block 
all existing types like (Halfond, Orso 2006).  
New attacks can be handled in some of the existing approaches like (Halfond, Orso 
2006, Boyd, Keromytis 2004) because these approaches block any sequence of SQL 
keywords that come through the user input. In this research, we focus on two points 
which are, how to detect new attacks in addition to track the attacker at various 
stages. Moreover, this research will develop a monitoring technique using the 
Anatempura tool that runs the detection over several states to find the related attacks 
and to detect new attacks. 
2.9. Summary 
This chapter has discussed SQL injection vulnerabilities. It provided an introduction 
that reviewed the web application architecture, provided a summary of web 
application vulnerabilities, and explained the problem of SQL injection attacks. It 
also discussed existing approaches and their detection and prevention techniques and 
focused on the related work underpinning the motivation of our approach. 
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The next chapter highlights the Anatempura tool and the Interval Temporal logic as 
formal specification language that will be used to specify the monitoring conditions 
that checks submitted data of the web application against SQL injection attacks. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Preliminaries 
Objectives 
 
 Reviewing temporal logic in general and ITL in detail. 
 Discussing the reasons of our selection of ITL. 
 Describe the Tempura syntax. 
 Providing the architecture of the Anatempura tool. 
 Describe the detection and prevention framework. 
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3.1. Introduction 
As aforesaid in the previous chapter, the detection and prevention of SQL injection 
approaches have been developed using different techniques. Some of these 
approaches monitor the application at runtime to check the user inputs against any 
form of SQL injection attacks. This research proposes a new approach to monitor the 
application at runtime using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and specifically using the 
Anatempura for runtime monitoring.  
This chapter introduces Anatempura and its underlying logic ITL. Section 3.2 
reviews temporal logic in general and provides examples that show the use of 
temporal logic. Section 3.3 introduces ITL, specifying its features, semantics, derived 
constructs, and our justification of using ITL. Section 3.4 describes Tempura 
(executable subset of ITL) and its syntax providing clarifying examples for each 
Tempura construct. Section 3.5 introduces the Anatempura tool and its common uses 
and features. Section 3.6 highlights the framework for detection of SQL injection 
attacks using Anatempura. Section 3.7 summarises this chapter.    
3.2. Temporal Logic Background 
The specification of any concurrent program should deal with the execution sequence 
of these programs in addition to the input and output behaviour of these programs. 
Temporal logic as a term is being used for expressing program properties involving 
program conditions, the program execution sequence, and termination etc. (Wolper 
1983).   In other words, temporal logic can express any system property and structure 
based on the execution of this system using a sequence of states. There are several 
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versions of temporal logics such as Computational Tree Logic (CTL), Linear 
Temporal Logic (LTL), and Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) etc. 
In general, these types are similar and focus on analysing the system requirements in 
addition to the topology of time for these requirements, and they differ from each 
other in their expressive power. CTL uses a tree-like structure to express the system 
in terms of its execution paths. Each path describes a specific execution and one of 
them will be the actual path. LTL expresses the system behaviour as a linear order of 
execution states of the system. ITL is based on LTL as linear order that can express 
system requirements. ITL distinguishes from other temporal logic by its use of a 
chop operator to sequentially compose sequences of states. ITL will be described in 
detail in Section 3.3. The following section highlights some examples of using 
temporal logic. 
3.2.1. Examples of Using Temporal Logic  
Temporal logic is being used in many studies for the specification of requirements, 
tracking behaviour, and monitoring systems etc.  Examples of these studies will be 
highlighted in the following: 
(Holzer, Kinder et al. 2007) have used a verification technique for malware detection 
based on Computation Tree Predicate Logic (CTPL) which is an extension of CTL. 
This approach uses a model checker called Mocca that expects as input assembly 
source code. Mocca has been used to determine whether a security property 
expressed in CTPL holds or not. The security property that is verified by Mocca is a 
specification of the behaviour of malicious software.  
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(Basin, Klaedtke et al. 2010) applied runtime monitoring using MFOTL (metric first 
order temporal logic) which provide monitoring that can check and enforce system 
policies like access or usage control policies using an expressive fragment of 
MFOTL. The fragment consists of formulae that specify system safety requirements. 
The feature of their proposed monitoring is that it can provide a specification of past 
and future behaviour using quantitative temporal operators for finite or infinite 
domain. In their experiment they just show the finite structure that is used for 
monitoring bank transactions. 
(Al Amro, Cau 2012) proposes a virus detection approach that can detect viruses 
based on the virus behaviour that is specified using ITL. The detection approach uses 
a tool set that is based on Anatempura (will be discussed later) that can monitor the 
application program interface (API) calls. 
ITL is our selected logic. ITL features and the reasons of our selection of ITL will be 
described in the following section. 
3.3. Interval Temporal Logic 
ITL is a formal specification language based on LTL that can express both 
propositional and first order logic properties and whose key notion is intervals. ITL 
can describe system requirements and behaviour as a finite sequence of states 
(interval). In addition, ITL can be used to handle both sequential and parallel 
composition. ITL has an executable framework Tempura which provides a 
development and testing environment for ITL specifications (Cau., Moszkowski. et 
al. 10/2012, Zhou, Zedan et al. 2005, Moszkowski 1994).  
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3.3.1. ITL Syntax 
Table 1 shows the syntax of ITL and provides the syntax of ITL expressions and 
formulas.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 ITL Syntax 
 
In Table1, ‘µ’ is a fixed integer value, ‘a’ is a static variable (variable has a constant 
value within an interval), ‘A’ is a state variable (can change within an interval), ‘g’ is 
function symbol, ‘p’ is predicate symbol, ‘f’ is formula.  
g is a expression that contains mathematical operators like subtraction (-) or addition 
(+) or others. Atomic formulae are constructed using one or more relational symbols 
like equal (=) or greater than or equal (≤) etc. Thus, ITL formulae will be composed 
using atomic formulae and connectives like (¬, ∨, ∧, , ) in addition to  temporal 
modalities like chop (;), chopstar (*) or skip. 
An interval  is denoted by   ...     an interval consists of one or more states 
 (   ). Each state of the interval is a mapping from the set of variables to the set 
of their values. The length of an interval denoted by ||, is equal to the number of 
      (        )|   |    ∧    |      |      |      |  
   
Expressions 
      |   |   |   (            )|O |       
 
Formulae 
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states  minus one. If the interval  =   …       then ||= n. 
For example, if the length of the interval is 4, the number of states in that interval 
will be 5. Table 3.2 lists some operations on intervals. 
Interval Type Specification 
prefix     …        (where  0 ≤ k ≤ || ) 
suffix   … | |     (where  0 ≤ k ≤ || ) 
sub   …         (where  0 ≤ k ≤ i ≤ || ) 
Table 3.2 Interval Operations 
The empty interval is a one state interval.  The following example shows a sample of 
an empty interval and a multi states interval. 
       
 
         
   
      
 
        
 
        
 
       
 
   
              Empty interval             Interval of length equal 4 
3.3.2. ITL Semantic 
As aforesaid, ITL describes sequences of states (interval). The formula that contains 
no temporal operator will be called a state formula, and thus will be hold at the initial 
state of an interval. All ITL formulae will be evaluated over the whole interval. For 
example,   ∧    will be true over an interval   iff     and     are both evaluated to 
true over this interval  . The following are some useful ITL constructs with their 
informal semantic: 
skip: is a unit interval and its length equal ‘1’. For example, the following interval 
has two states ‘  ’ and ‘  ’, and its length is equal to ‘1’. 
          
 
           
 
   
Skip 
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 f1; f2:  this formula will be true over an interval if that interval can be decomposed 
into a prefix and suffix interval, and f1 holds over the former and f2 holds over the 
latter, and the prefix and suffix interval share a state. 
    
     
 
             
 
            
 
            
 
           
 
 
           Example of chop construct 
 
   : this formula will be true over an interval if that interval can be decomposed 
into a number of  sub intervals and the formula f is true over all these sub intervals. 
 
     
 
          
 
           
 
            
 
           
 
           
 
            
 
  
Example of Chop star 
 
3.2.3. Derived Constructs 
Some frequently used derived ITL constructs are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 
(Cau., Moszkowski. et al. 10/2012).  
 
Table 3.3 Non Temporal Constructs 
f1 f2 
f f f 
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Ο ƒ   skip ; ƒ next 
more   Ο true non-empty interval 
empty   ¬ more empty interval 
 f   true ; ƒ sometimes 
□ f   ¬ ¬ƒ always 
Ⓦf   ¬ O¬ƒ weak next 
f   ƒ ; true some initial subinterval 
□ f   ¬ (¬ƒ) all initial subinterval 
f   true ; ƒ ; true some subinterval 
□ f   ¬ (¬ƒ) all subinterval 
fin f    □(empty  ƒ) Final state 
halt f   □(empty ≡ ƒ) Exactly in the final state 
Table 3.4 Temporal Constructs 
3.2.4. Examples of ITL 
 The formula A=5 means that the variable A has a value 5 in the initial state. 
 In the interval, there are two variables A and B, the variable A is always equal 3, 
the variable B is equal to 0 in the first state and equal to 2 in the next state, the 
interval will be expressed as follow 
B=0∧ □ (A=3) ∧ O (B=2) ∧ skip 
          
 
  
              
  
            
 In the interval, there are three variables A, B and C.  The variable A equals ‘R’, B 
is an array of non-accepted characters [‘+’, ‘*’, ‘/’], and the variable C will be used 
to store the comparison result between  A and B, C is equal to  ‘y’ if they are similar 
or ‘n’ if not. The length of the array is denoted by |B|. The interval can be expressed 
as follow 
i 
i i 
a 
a 
a 
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 skip ∧ A=’R’ ∧ B = [‘+’, ‘*’, ‘/’] ∧ if (i:0 ≤ i ≤ |B| ∧ B[i] =A)  
 then C=’y’ 
 else C=’n’ 
The interval here is a two state interval. 
 In the interval, if there is a choice between two formulas that will be executed 
depending on the value of the propositional variable ‘A’. The interval can be 
expressed as follow 
(A∧    )∨ (¬A ∧   ) 
3.3.5. Why ITL? 
Our selection of ITL is based on a number of reasons that make ITL the language of 
choice for our proposed detection and prevention technique for SQL injection 
attacks.  
 ITL has the Anatempura tool which is a runtime verification tool that can be used 
for monitoring external applications like web applications. Anatempura has a 
pluggable architecture that can easily connect to other applications and it also has 
other features that will be highlighted in Section 3.4.  
 The checking procedures that check the user input against SQL injection attacks is 
a sequence of several checking stages for each transaction. ITL can describe this 
sequence of stages because of the chop operator.  
 The user behaviour will be investigated for all transactions using the checking   
results. The checking result will be preserved and expressed as ITL intervals. ITL 
operators like skip and chop are well suited to handle the intervals that contain the 
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checking results of the web application transactions which are an important factor in 
the investigation of user behaviour.  
3.4. Tempura 
Tempura is a programming language based on ITL developed by Ben Moszkowski.  
Tempura provides an executable framework for development and experimenting of 
suitable ITL specifications. Tempura variables are similar to ITL as it has ‘state’ and 
‘static’ variables which can be Integers, Booleans, Floats or Strings, or a derived type 
like lists. Tempura has most of other conventional imperative programming 
languages features. For example, Tempura contains iteration construct such as for 
statement, and it has most of regular operators such as (+),(-) and ,or etc.  However, 
ITL differs from Tempura slightly because Tempura can run only ITL specifications 
that satisfy three conditions which concern the length of the interval and the variables 
with their values in addition to that the formula should be deterministic (Moszkowski 
1985). The following examples show some different samples of executable and non-
executable Tempura code. 
 S= 0  ∧ skip ∧ O (S = 1)  is executable. 
len (5) ∧ □(S= 2)   is executable. 
empty ∧ (S= 0 ∨ S = 1)  is non-executable as there is no unique value for S. 
len (3) ∧ S gets S + 5  is non-executable as there is no initial value of S that 
can be incremented. 
3.4.1. Tempura Syntax 
Tempura is an executable subset of ITL. The syntax of Tempura can be classified 
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into three main categories, Locations, Expressions and Statements. 
 Locations 
Locations which determine where values are stored and can be examined in a 
specific interval. Thus, if there is an existing variable A, then the location of variable 
in the next state will be determined by next A. There are various variable types in 
Tempura such as   
Integer number such as 0, 1, 5, -1,-2, or float numbers like $0.001$. 
List variables which are arrays of fixed or variable length.  
There are also other types like Boolean and String variables. The types of 
expressions in Tempura with a clarifying example will be highlighted in the 
following.   
 Expressions 
The types of Tempura expressions are, for example, integer, string, list, float or 
Boolean.  
Integer Expression 
These types of expressions return an integer value and the operators that can be used 
with it are: +,-, **,>, or mod   etc.  For example  
exists A , B, C: { A=1 and B=2 and C =A+B and empty}. 
C=A+ next B 
If (next A) = B then C=2*A else C=2*B 
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Boolean Expression 
These types of expressions return a Boolean value either true or false when 
evaluated. For example 
A>B  
next A > 0 
List Expression 
List variables are defined using List(S, n) or list(S, n) commands. The command 
‘List’ defines a list ‘S’ of size up to n. The command ‘list’ defines the array ‘S’ of 
fixed size n. Moreover, the structure of an existing array ‘S’ can be fixed over the 
interval using the command:  stable (structure (S)).  For example 
S[2][1] ='a'   to assign value a to list S[2][1]. 
next S=S+A[2]   to add the value of A[2] to list S in the next stae. 
The size of array S= [‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’]  is equal to 3. The list size is denoted by |S|. 
String expression 
String expressions have a string as value and these are enclosed in double quotes 
such as “the mentioned value is a string”. String values include most of the C escapes 
characters. For example, the new line can be introducing using \n. The string values 
also can be appended using the ‘+’ operator like “aaa” + “bbb” = “aaabbb”. 
Moreover, to copy part of a string value one can use S[i..j] where i denoted the 
beginning and j denoted the end index of the substring. Some examples of using 
string expressions: 
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S3 = S1 +S2 or S3=S1+next S2 
S1 [2..4] =[S[2],S[3],S[4]]  
Let  S1 = “abcd”   then the substring of S1[3..4]=”cd” 
Float expression  
Float expressions have a floating point value. Tempura denotes float values by 
enclosing them between two $ characters. Float expressions can be printed using %F. 
For example  
format("the value: %F ", Var)  
A=itof(B)*$100$  ‘itof'  to change the variable type from integer to float. 
A= tan($70$) 
 Statements 
Statements are a subset of ITL in addition to Tempura system commands that can be 
used to define simple or compound statements.  
Example of Simple Statements 
 A=B    assignment in current state.  
 A gets e  to assign value of ‘e’ to variable ‘A’ throughout the interval. 
stable (A)  variable ‘A’ has a constant value for all states in the interval. 
empty  interval of length zero. 
skip   interval of length 1. 
The next operator is used to refer to the variable in  next state as long as the  next 
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state exists. For example, 
 next (A) =A+1    or     A:=A+1 
A in the next state is assigned the current value of A plus 1.  
len(5)   has interval length 5.   
Example of Compound Statements 
Choice  
Choice in Tempura is denoted by the if statement.  
If (A=B) then output A else {output A and output B} 
if A then     and  if B then      
if A then    else     
Loop  
Loop in Tempura is denoted by for, while and repeat. 
while I <=|S| do { I:=I+1 and output S[I] and skip} 
repeat {S:=S+[|S|+1] and skip} until (|S|=5)   
for i<|S| do { S[i]:=S[i]*2 and skip} 
Forall 
This operator is a universal quantification  forall i<n: {…}.  It corresponds to 
indexed concurrency. 
forall i< |S| : {S[i]:=S[i] +2 }  
all list elements are assigned a new value concurrently.  
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Keep 
keep A=4 and len(6) 
A is 4 in all state of the interval except the last state. The last state will be determined 
using another operator i.e, fin and halt. 
Keep (x=4) and len (5) ; (x=5 and empty)  
The X variable in the first interval has no value at the last state on the interval.  
System commands  
There are two system commands which will be used for executing Tempura code 
such as, ‘run’ for executing a program, ‘load’ for loading a program. There are also 
other system commands such as, the ‘input’ command to request a value from the 
user. The ‘output’ command prints a variable value or any text using double or single 
quotes and it can print to file or on screen. format is an output command that has 
feature C programming language style string characters.  
set outfile="stdout"   set output to be on  screen. 
set infile="input file"    input data from file. 
format(“the number is: %2d \n”,Var)  print a text with a variable value. 
output(Var)      print the variable value. 
output (‘any text’)    print a string. 
input (X)     input the variable value. 
/* run */ define name() = { tempura code}.   define a program with a specific name.  
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load "../library/exprog".   load a program file. 
Sequential and Parallel execution 
The sequential execution uses the chop operator that ends the current interval 
execution and starts a new interval. For example if there are two procedures P1 and 
P2 as follows 
define P1(L) = {exists X: { X=L and X gets X+1 and len(5) and fin (output X)} }. 
define P2(L) = { exists X: { X=L and X gets X+2 and len(5) and fin (output X)}}. 
Sequential example 
/* run */ define Test1 () = {  exists A,B: {  A=3 and P1(A)};{ B=2 and P2(B) } }. 
The first interval has a length of 5 and the P1 procedure gets executed, the second 
interval has also a length of 5 and the P2 procedure is executed. Thus, the overall 
interval length is 10. 
   
 
  
          
 
  
          
 
  
          
 
  
          
 
  
          
 
  
        
 
  
         
 
  
         
 
  
          
 
  
         
 
   
 
 Note that state number 5 is a shared state the two intervals are fused at this state. It 
contains both of A and B variables. The state 5 ends the prefix interval of the P1 
procedure (for A variable), and starts a suffix interval for the P2 procedure (for B 
variable).   
Parallel example 
/* run */ define Test () = { exists A,B: {  A=3 and B=2 and P1(A) and  P2(B) } }. 
In this example, P1 and P2 are executed in parallel, and the overall interval length is 
5. 
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Halt  
Halt operator is being used to define the interval termination condition.   
A = 3 and A gets A+1 and halt (A=6) 
In this example, A is 3 in the initial state, and A will be incremented with 1 in the 
next state until the value of A equal 6 as the interval will be terminated by halt 
condition A=6. 
Fin 
There are two versions of fin operator such as,  fin (A) which means the value of 
variable ‘A’ at the end of the interval (a location). The other version is fin (A=5), i.e., 
a statement, which means variable ‘A’ must have 5 at the end of the interval.  
Both halt and fin statements concern the last state of the interval. The difference 
between them is that halt terminates as soon as the termination condition has been 
reached whereas fin only requires the final state to satisfy the final condition.  
Always, Sometimes 
always f  means that there is a formula f holds for every suffix interval.  
sometime f  means that there exists suffix interval for which f holds. 
always (output (A))   print the value of A in every state of the interval. 
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{ A=0 and len(3) and A gets A+1 and sometimes (A = 2 and output A)}. 
In this example, A is 0 in the initial state, and the interval length is determined to be 
3. A will be incremented with 1 in each next state, and when A reached the state with 
a value equal 2 then the value of A will be printed.  
Exists 
This operator is being used to introduce the local variables either static or state. 
 exists A,B:{ A=0 and B=1 and skip and B:=A }    “B:=” means next B 
Functions 
Tempura functions are denoted by,  define F(  ,…..,   ) ={e}.  A parameter will be 
passed to a function via ‘call by reference’. 
define F(A) ={A+2}.  
The function is called:  B=F(A) 
Following example shows how to call the function using more than one parameter. 
define Power(A,B)={A**B}.  
Function call:   C= Power(A,B) 
Procedure 
Following concerns procedure calls. 
 define CallbyValue(X,A) = {     
exists B:{B=A and B:=B+3 and skip and fin(X=B)}}. 
Variable X is used to return the procedure result. This procedure can be called using 
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the following Tempura code. 
define TestCallbyValue () = { 
 exists C,D: { 
C=3 and testValue(D,C) and  fin(output(D))} 
}. 
The mentioned syntax of Tempura can be executed using the Anatempura tool which 
will be explained in the next section. 
3.5. Anatempura 
Anatempura is a tool that can execute Tempura code. Anatempura is also a runtime 
verification and validation tool that can be used to monitor and check specific 
application conditions at runtime (Al Amro, Cau 2011, El-kustaban, Moszkowski et 
al. 2012). Moreover, Anatempura has a visualisation component with a graphic 
interface that can simplify the tracking and the analysis of the monitoring results. It 
has a pluggable architecture that can easily connect to other applications. The first C-
version of the Tempura interpreter is by Roger Hale, after that further development 
has been done by Ben Moszkowski and Antonio Cau.  
In addition, runtime verification as used in Anatempura does not suffer from the state 
explosion problem such as experienced by model checkers (Cimatti, Clarke et al. 
2002, Holzmann 1997).  The explosion problem happens as a result of the huge 
number of states that are used to specify the system behaviour. The specification will 
determine all possible system sequence states that can be reached and uses by the 
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System PropertiesModel
    
All system possible Behaviours
Beh1
Beh2 
Beh3
.
    
The Property Behaviours
          =  
     
Model Checker
model checker to check the system property.  
The state transition used to describe system behaviour, will be determined using two 
factors which are the current state and the transition relation. The corresponding finite 
automaton of the system is intersected with the automaton of the negation of the 
property (Valmari 1998). If this intersection is empty the system satisfies the 
property. If the intersection is not empty it will constitute a counter example why the 
system does not satisfy the property. If there are three processes and the system has10 
variables, thus the number of states will be     =1000.  Thus, if the system has 
thousands of variables the number of states grows too big to be practical. Figure 3.1 
shows the technique that is used by the model checker to check the system properties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Anatempura a new state is computed on the fly using rewrite rules as follows:  
f = w∧     f ’   where ‘w’ is the current or initial state, and that means the next state will 
be accepted only if formula  f ’  is valid from the next state on ward. This reduces the 
number of the states to be only the current one that is used during the runtime 
w 
Figure 3.1  Model Checker Technique. 
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Current behaviour f
 =   ⃝    
  =   ⃝    
  =   ⃝    
            
            
validation process. So there is no need to compute the automaton with its states as is 
done by model checkers.  Figure 3.2 the Anatempura Technique 
Figure 3.2 shows how Anatempura reduces the number of states using the weak next 
operator. Therefore, if    is not the same as    then we know that the system 
behaviour so far will not satisfy the property, otherwise we continue with      and we 
need to check whether it is the same as   . Again if they are not the same we know 
that the system behaviour so far will not satisfy the property.   
The general architecture of Anatempura is as follow: 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the main components of the Anatempura tool which are Tempura 
 
Figure 3.2  Anatempura Technique. 
Figure 3.3 General Architecture of Anatempura 
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interpreter, the monitor and animator. 
The Tempura interpreter executes Tempura code in addition to validating the monitor 
conditions. The monitoring conditions of Anatempura are the assertion points which 
can be easy inserted in the application source code. These points will be used to 
generate a sequence of states as the application runs like values of variable and the 
timestamp. This sequence represents a behaviour of the application and can be used 
by Tempura.  Listing 3.1 shows an example of assertion point in Java. 
 
Listing 3.1 Java Assertion Point 
Listing 3.1 is a Java print command that contains “!PROG:assert Var:"+Val+":time!” 
as an assertion point. This assertion point is captured by the monitor as Val is a value 
of Var when the ‘print’ command is executed.  
For example, the following java code contains an assertion point as follow: 
Date Time = new Date(); 
 System.out.println ("!PROG: assert Name:"+Name+":"+ Time.toString()+"!\n"); 
This assertion point sends a variable called Name, its value and the system current 
time to Anatempura. In this research, the assertion points will be added manually to 
the application source code to monitor the user’s entries and behaviour, the assertion 
points can be added automatically using JIE tool (Tromer 1999). 
Anatempura will be used to perform two tasks. The first task is to monitor the 
application’s submitted data and check whether this data contains any form of SQL 
        System.out.println ("!PROG: assert Var:"+Val+":time!\n"); 
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injection attack. The second task is to investigate related attacks using the checking 
result of the submitted data. 
3.6. Using of Anatempura in Our Framework 
As the main goal of this research is the detection and prevention against SQL 
injection attacks, we need to develop a new security framework that uses runtime 
verification as shown in Figure 3.2. 
   
Figure 3.4 The Main framework Architecture 
This framework shows the main components of the proposed detection technique. It 
is based on the specification of SQL injection attacks and the monitoring tool 
Anatempura which checks these attacks. Anatempura will perform the monitoring of 
all web application transactions and checks each transaction input according to the 
SQL injection attacks specifications. As aforesaid in Chapter 2 on the SQL injection 
attacks techniques, there are some characters that are used frequently in SQL 
injection like a single quotation character. Thus, if a single quotation character is 
blocked that means the injection that is based on this character will be blocked as 
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well.  
Thus, key to this detection technique is producing an accurate ITL specification of 
attacks. The detection results will be used in the investigation of the attack 
behaviour. Therefore, Anatempura keeps track of each transaction as it checks the 
current transaction and investigates the related attacks for existing transactions. The 
following chapters (4 and 5) will describe in detail how the detection and tracking is 
implemented based on Anatempura. 
3.7. Summary 
This chapter reviewed temporal logic in general and described various types of them 
and discussed the differences between them. An overview of the selected logic ITL 
with its executable tool Tempura has been provided together with its syntax and 
semantics.  
 Moreover, Tempura operators and their common use with clarifying examples for 
each operator have been provided.  This chapter is concluded with highlighting the 
Anatempura tool, showing its general architecture. The next chapter provides details 
of our proposed detection and prevention framework which is based on the 
Anatempura. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Architecture of Detection and 
Prevention Framework 
Objectives 
 Provides an overview of the detection and prevention framework.  
 Describe the framework phases. 
 Describe the components of the architecture. 
  Give examples of user behaviour. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 has introduced SQL injection attacks describing the various techniques 
that are used to attack a web application. Chapter 2 also discussed the existing 
approaches that are developed to tackle this problem and discussed existing solutions 
to block these types of attacks. Chapter 3 has reviewed the Anatempura tool that is 
chosen as a basis of our framework showing its architecture and describing the 
underlying logic ITL used by this tool and its executable engine Tempura. 
Anatempura checks the input data for existing SQL injection attacks by monitoring 
the web application’s inputs using the attack specifications expressed in Tempura. 
This chapter explains in detail our Detection and Prevention Framework (DPF).  
The contents of this chapter are organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the DPF 
architecture and provides an overview of the detection and prevention framework. 
Section 4.3 discusses the initial phase of the DPF. Section 4.4 provides the details of 
the checking phase that is used in the analysis of the user entry data. Section 4.5 
describes the decision phase in detail by specifying the user behaviour and the 
feedback component. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a summary of this chapter.  
4.2. Overview of Detection and Prevention Framework (DPF) 
The main aims of DPF is the monitoring and blocking of SQL injection attacks that 
are used to gain unauthorised access of web applications and their databases. DPF 
uses Anatempura as runtime monitoring and verification tool to block malicious 
users inputs. DPF is initialized by specifying existing attack patterns using Tempura. 
Anatempura will be connected to a web application server to monitor the users input 
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using the attacks specifications. Figure 4.1 shows the main architecture of DPF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DPF starts when the user enters data and submits the web application page, the data 
will be sent from the client machine to the web server using the HTTP protocol. 
Moreover, DPF extracts the submitted data in the capture user input component. 
Extracting the data depends on the hotspots of a web application, which maps the 
submitted data to its variables in the web application.  The hotspots can be detected 
using one of the existing static analysis tools such as the pixy tool for web 
applications that are developed using PHP (Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the hotspots will be assumed to exist. The extracted data will be 
transformed into Anatempura assertion point format (variable, value, timestamp) so 
that the Tempura interpreter can use this data to check against existing attack patterns 
using the input checker component. The result determines whether the input is good, 
Users Input checker
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Figure 4.1 The Architecture of Detection and Prevention Framework 
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bad or unknown and this information will be used for the investigation of related 
attacks.  
DPF has three checking components which are input checker, output checker and 
database observer, and each one of them uses a different technique for checking the 
user input. The first checking stage uses the input checker to analyse the user input 
using two steps, the first step will analyse the user input to check whether it is a good 
input (see Section 4.3.1), if the first step determines that the user input is not good 
then the second step will compare those inputs with the existing attack patterns.   
Thus, if the first step considers the user input to be good then it will be sent for 
processing by the application processing component.  If the user input matches an 
existing attack pattern, the input will be rejected and the user will be informed by the 
DPF feedback component as a part of the decision phase (see Section 4.5). In 
addition, the DPF decision phase has another component that updates the user 
behaviour database with information that a bad input has been used to attack the web 
application. Note that the user behaviour will be updated in both cases whether the 
input was good or bad, and it will be used for investigating related attacks (see 
Section 4.5.2).  
If the input checker cannot determine whether the user data is good or bad then DPF 
will run the database observer to determine what the effect of the user input is on the 
database engine. Thus, if the user input is accepted (see Section 4.4.2) by the 
database observer then DPF will send the user input to application processing 
component, if the user input is not accepted (see Section 4.4.2) then DPF will reject 
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the user input and inform the user using the DPF’s feedback component, and then 
DPF will also update both the user’s behaviour database and the existing attacks 
pattern with information that a new injection attack has been used on the web 
application.  
The last step of the checking phase is the output checker which is used to determine 
whether the message that is communicated from the database engine to the user 
contains any information about the database type or structure or not (see Section 
4.4.3).  DPF consists of three phases which are the initial phase, checking phase and 
decision phase. These phases will be discussed in detail in the following section.  
4.3. Initial Phase (receiving Data) 
The initial phase consists of several steps that need to be done before data can arrive 
at the input checker component. The first step in this stage provides the Tempura 
formula that is used to analyse the user’s input. This formula is based on the 
specification of SQLlib (SQLlib-tool 2007) which is an open source tool. The 
following specifies the Initial phase and describes its components: 
4.3.1. Initial Capture of User Input 
The initial capture of user input step component needs to determine the good input 
and the bad input at character level as shown in Figure 4.2. 
Good input should not include any bad symbol like single quotation and double 
quotation or star, or the good input should not contains any of the SQL keywords that 
can be used to attack the web application database. Furthermore, the bad input will 
be specified by describing some of the existing attack patterns like union query, 
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piggyback query, and tautology etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Initial specifications 
The existing attacks specifications will be merged for any attack that uses the same 
injection character which means that the specification formula does not described 
each type separately.  
For example, the blind attacks can be done using a single quotation similar to a 
piggyback attack, so the specification of the attacks that involve a single quotation do 
not need to be in a separate detection formula, and both attacks can be detected  
using a specification that covers the attacks that use a single quotation. Therefore, the 
initial bad/ good specification will be used by Anatempura for initializing the DPF.  
4.3.2. Users 
In DPF the users are considered to be a part of the initial phase because any 
transaction will be started from the user. Thus, the user is anyone who submits an 
HTTP request to the web application. So, the user would be good, bad or unknown. 
Therefore, there are no beforehand assumptions proposed for users behaviour.  
Initial Specifications
Good input specification Bad  input specification
No SQL sympols No SQL keywords Existing SQL injection attacks pattern
Union TautologyPiggyback Alternative encodingDatabase ProcedureBlind logical
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Step 2
Using Anatempura
Step 1
Using Library call of web 
Application
User
Capture Data
Drop extra 
spaces
Transform to 
lower case
Extracting 
Data
 
 
4.3.3. Capturing Data 
At this stage the system will analyse the HTTP request to extract the user input data, 
then the extracted data will be transformed into Anatempura’s assertion point format. 
Moreover, Anatempura normalizes this data using two procedures that transform it in 
a style without extra spaces and only lower case characters. This normalization step 
will be useful to block any attacker who tries to use extra spaces or upper and lower 
characters as attack methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
The capturing Data component consists of two steps which are the extract data and 
normalize data steps. This extract data step does not involve Anatempura but is 
performed at the web application side. In other words, the data will be extracted by 
using a library call offered by the programming language that is used to develop the 
web application.  
4.4. Checker Phase 
In this phase, the system will analyse the data that comes from the capturing data 
component. The phase will uses three checking components and these are as follows: 
Figure 4.3 Capture Data component 
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4.4.1. Input Checker Component 
This component is the heart of the DPF as it determines the next step of DPF whether 
to proceed to the application normal processing component or the database observer 
component. Moreover, the input checker component will use the existing attack 
patterns that are prepared by the initial capture of user input component. The input 
checker component will analyse the user entry against existing attack, and the result 
is one of three possibilities: 
The entry data is good, which means that the user input does not contain any SQL 
symbols or keywords that are used in existing SQL injection attacks, so the data will 
be passed to the application server for normal processing, and the user’s behaviour 
will be updated. The other possibility is that the entry data is bad, then the data will 
be rejected and the user’s behaviour will be updated and a message will be prepared 
to be sent to the user via the feedback component.  
The last possibility is that the entry data is unknown; in this case the database 
observer component determines whether the entry data is bad or good according to 
effect these data have on the database. The database observer component checks the 
entry data by validating four conditions that determines whether the entry data is safe 
or not.  The database observer component will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
4.4.2. Database Observer Component 
This component will check unknown entry cases which are not caught by the input 
checker component. The purpose of the database observer component is to determine 
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what exactly will happen to the database on the transaction of user input, and this 
will be done by monitoring the outcome of each database transaction.  
The monitoring of the database transaction needs the web application developer 
because the database observer component needs the developer to specify the 
expected result of each transaction that is run by the web application such as, the 
table name, running command type, number of the expected records, and the user 
type.  
The expected result of a database transaction will be compared with the runtime 
result. The comparison between the expected result and the runtime result is used to 
ensure that the database transaction is safe (if the runtime result is similar to what the 
developer expected) as shown in the Figure 4.4.  In case of a unsafe transaction the 
database will be rolled back to the state before this unsafe transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the database observer has to monitor four conditions for each transaction; 
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those conditions are specified by the web application developer as follows: 
 Transaction type at runtime is the same as the expected one specified by the 
developer. For example, if the transaction type at runtime is “Select” and the 
expected one is “Select” as well, then the database observer component will accept 
this transaction and continue. If they are different the database observer component 
will do a rollback and prepare a feedback message for the user and update the user’s 
behaviour. 
 The transaction table name at runtime is the same as the expected one that is 
specified by the developer. For example, if the transaction table name at runtime is 
“users” and the expected table name is also “users” then the database observer 
component will accept this transaction and continue to the next step. If they are 
different then the database observer component will do a rollback and prepare a 
feedback message for the user and update the user’s behaviour. 
 The transaction record number at runtime is the same as the expected number that 
is specified by the developer. For example, the login page normally returns one 
record with the select statement, so if at runtime the select statement returns the same 
number (one record), then the database observer component will accept this 
transaction, otherwise it will be rejected and the database observer component will 
do a rollback and prepare a feedback message for the user and update the user’s 
behaviour. 
 Transaction user type at runtime is the same as the expected one that is specified 
by the developer. For example, the user tries to change the password at the change 
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password page then the user type should be same to the expected one. However, if 
the user tries to change another user’s password then the database observer 
component will catch this, then this transaction will be rejected and the database 
engine will do a rollback and prepare a feedback message for the user and update the 
user’s behaviour.  
Note the database observer can only deal with recoverable transactions so no DDL 
(Data Definition Languages) commands like create, drop, and alter table, because the 
injected DDL commands cannot be recovered by a rollback command, so these 
transactions should already be rejected by the input checker component. 
4.4.3. Output Checker Component 
This component checks whether the message sent to the user is safe or not. The 
output checker will not analyse the response in the same way as the input checker, as 
it will block any message that contains details about the database structure or type 
because these types of messages are not safe. Moreover, the output checker will 
block unsafe messages using the library calls in the programming language which is 
employed during the development of the web application. 
4.5. Decision Phase 
This phase of DPF depends on the results of the input and output checking phases, 
and consists of the feedback and user’s behaviour components.   
4.5.1. Feedback Component 
The feedback component prepares the message that will be sent to the user regarding 
the cases of bad entry data. If the user entry is bad and the input is caught as unsafe 
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then DPF will respond to this entry by using a prepared message depending on the 
type of badness. 
4.5.2. User’s Behaviours Component 
SQL injection attacks usually consists of several steps, this component focuses on the 
main point of this research which is how to investigate the user behaviour according 
the history of entry data.  DPF will track each transaction in the system and detects 
the type of the transaction, i.e, whether it is a good, bad or unknown transaction. The 
tracking information will be used to model the user behaviour. Therefore, the user 
behaviour depends on the result of the input and output checker components in 
addition to the result of the database observer component. The DPF will use user 
information like IP address, user status (good, bad), attacking technique (primitive, 
advance), and time stamp of the transaction to build the user behaviour as shown in 
Figure 4.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows a sample of a web application transaction that contains both good and 
bad attempts as determined in the checking phase. Transaction 3, 6 and 7 are related 
as T3 is start SQL injection attacks using a specific technique, and T6 and T7 are 
T0 T2T1
T3
Pre.
T5T4
T6
Adv.
T7
Adv.
T10T8 T9
Technique Used  Relation Same IP addrerss  
T0 to T10  is a 
system transaction
Pre primitive attempt 
 Adv advance attempt      
 
 Figure 4.5 Transactions Relation 
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30 % Bad Transaction
90% Good Transaction
Three Sequence Transaction
based on T3 as they cannot be executed if T3 does not inject successfully.  T8 and 
T10 are related as they have come from the same IP address. The following ITL 
formula determines whether two bad inputs are related by IP address: 
 IP. (Status(Input) = Bad  IP(Input) = IP) ;  (Status(Input) = Bad  IP(Input) = IP)  
This means if the IP of the user in a certain state is equivalent to the IP of the user in 
a previous state then these inputs are related. Another example of related attacks is 
shown by the following ITL formula which determines whether two bad inputs are 
related “by stored procedure “. 
 command.   (Declare (Input) = command);  (EXEC (Input) = command) 
This means if there is an execution of a stored procedure command in a certain state 
and the declaration of that stored procedure in a previous state then these inputs are 
related. 
Moreover, the DPF can determine user behaviour according to the following three 
criteria: the percentage of transactions, the sequence of transaction type, and the 
transaction types as shown in Figure 4.6.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Examples of User Behaviour 
Figure 4.6 shows several user behaviour graphically. Therefore, user behaviour can 
be used as a quick way to view the transactions status and the proportion of hacking 
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attempts that have been done so far. It can act as an early warning system. 
4.5.3. Example of user’s Behaviour 
This example illustrates how attacker’s information can be used to model user 
behaviour. This example describes an input scenario and assumes that the status of 
each input is already determined by the DPF checking phase as mentioned in the 
checking phase of Section 4.4. Table 4.1 shows a particular input scenario that 
involves several sample user inputs.  
Seq. User IP  The input status 
1  146.168.255.12 Normal g 
2  146.168.255.13 Normal g 
3  82.164.254.12 ‘ or ‘1’=’1  b 
4  82.164.254.12 ‘;drop table users;-- b 
5  212.164.254.14 Normal g 
6  212.164.254.16 Normal g 
7  212.164.254.14 any’; declare @NewStoreProcedure char(80) …….; g 
8  67.164.254.14 Normal g 
9  146.164.2.46 ‘ ; b 
10  212.164.254.14 Normal g 
11  182.164.254.23 any’; EXEC (@NewStoreProcedure); b 
12  212.164.254.14 Normal g 
13  212.164.254.16 Normal g 
Table 4.1 Selective User’s Inputs 
In Table 4.1, input 3 and 4 are marked as bad, those attempts are one step attacks 
because they do not retrieve any information from the database and just try to inject 
the harmful code in the web application fields. However, those attempts have the 
same IP address which means there is a relation between them because both attempts 
have been done by the same user. Input 7 and 11 can be classified as related as well, 
because the attacker here declares the stored procedure in the first attempt and in the 
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second attempt he/she uses it. So there is a relation between these hacking attempts 
and this justifies the use of monitoring user behaviour.   
4.5.4. Updating of User’s Behaviour Component 
The user’s behaviour will be updated continuously within DPF according to the 
result of the checking phase. The updating will involve all of the user’s inputs types 
(good, bad). Thus, this component will update behaviour according to the three 
criteria used to investigate the sequence of bad transactions: the percentage of the 
checking result type, related IPs and related techniques.   
4.5.5. Updates Existing Attack Patterns Component 
This component receives new attack patterns from the database observer component. 
When the database observer finds any unsafe input, it will send the input to this 
component to update the existing attack patterns. Note the updating of the attack 
patterns library will be manually, because the library that is used by input checker is 
specified in ITL, thus the updating uses manual translation into ITL by anyone who 
expert in ITL.  
4.6. Summary 
An overview of the architecture of our framework DPF has been presented in this 
chapter. The framework phases and the components of each phase have been 
discussed. This chapter also describes the task of each component in detail and how 
these components will interact with each other. The user’s behaviour has been 
discussed in detail using a clarifying example. The following chapter will present the  
implementation of the DPF. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Detection and Prevention Framework 
Implementation  
Objectives 
 Provide the reasons of selection of tools for the implementation. 
 Provide the architecture of selected components. 
  Present the implementation of each component. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has described the main structure and processes of DPF that are 
proposed to check the submitted data that comes to the application server through 
http requests. This chapter describes in detail how the DPF is implemented and it is 
organized as follows, Section 5.2 describes the DPF implementation assumptions in 
order to realize DPF. Section 5.3 describes the implementation of all the components 
of the DPF. Section 5.4 gives the summary of this chapter.  
5.2.Implementation Assumptions 
The existence of different types of programming languages and DBMS that can be 
used for creating and developing web application is a reason for choosing a specific 
environment to implement our framework. The implementation is used to determine 
the interaction and the compatibility between the components and to know exactly 
the effectiveness of Anatempura with this environment as a runtime monitoring tool. 
Additionally, SQL injection attacks normally depend on the type of DBMS that is 
used as application repository, because some of the SQL commands work only for a 
particular DBMS.  For example, a MSSQL database can be injected using single 
quotation, or semicolon, or double dash --, /* ... */  and xp_ (for stored procedure 
catalog name) characters (MSDN 2008).  
Thus, the development language that is chosen is PHP and the DBMS is MYSQL. 
This selection is based on the fact that PHP and MYSQL are free resources and they 
can be installed together using one execution file like ‘WampServer’ (Bourdon. 
2013). Our choice of MYSQL means that we focus on the injection possibilities that 
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affect this database type which are restricted as follows (Matsuda, Koizumi et al. 
2011, Clarke 2012): 
 Using a semicolon. 
 Using a single quotation as a character data and string delimiter. 
 The comment delimiter is either hash mark ‘#’ or inline comment /* ...*/. 
 The encoded character using ‘0x’ for executing hexadecimal code and ‘%’ 
percentage. 
Therefore, the implementation will focus on these as they are key to SQL injection 
attacks. In addition, the implementation is created to test the SQL injection attacks 
for web application, thus we assume that hotspots of the web application have been 
determined before using existing tools.  
5.3. DPF Components Implementation 
DPF has several components which were already described in the previous chapter. 
The following will be implemented first: capturing Data component. This component 
will be used to extract submitted data and send them to the input checker using a 
library call in the PHP development language.  The second step will be the usage of 
the extracted data which are a user IP address, submission time stamp, and a user 
input. This information will be sent to Anatempura using the PHP-Java Bridge 
(Bökemeier., Koerber. 2012) as the Anatempura cannot communicate directly with 
an  PHP application. The bridge supports transportation of data between PHP and 
Java application at runtime and sends the extracted data to a Java application and this 
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Java application sends them to the Anatempura tool. The Java application that 
communicates with the Anatempura is implemented using Java RMI (Remote 
Method Invocation) (Oracle. 2012) as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Java application is running as a server that can communicate with a PHP 
application using the bridge. Thus, the extracted data will be analysed by the input 
checker that is executed by Anatempura to detect the input status and decide which 
data is safe or not before passing it to the application database. Additionally, there 
are other processes like the user behaviour and database observer which will be 
described later on. The implementation of all of the mentioned components will be 
explained in detail in the following Section. 
5.3.1. Capturing Data Component 
This component prepares the data to be analysed by the Anatempura tool, so the 
submitted information that comes to the server via HTTP requests will be 
Figure 5.1 Implementation General Architecture 
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reformatted in Anatempura format which is (IP address, submitted data, submission 
time) as shown in the Figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Http Request Extracting Data 
The discussed information will be extracted using the following PHP code to extract 
the value for a specific variable in a HTTP request: 
 
The value here for a variable called ‘username’. The submission time will be 
extracted using the following: 
 
The user IP address can be extracted by: 
 
As aforesaid, the extracted information will be sent to the Java application and then 
to Anatempura using the PHP-Java Bridge. The java application (RMI) that transfers 
UserIP = $_SERVER  ["REMOTE_ADDR"] 
Time=Date ("h:i:s A") 
Value= $_REQUEST ["username"]  
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the data between Java and PHP consist of three files which are ServerImpl for the 
implementation of the server methods, Server to define the RMI server method, and 
Client to communicate with PHP. After installing the Bridge, PHP initializes an 
instance of ‘Client’ and calls it by the value that will be checked using the script as 
shown in Listing 5.1. 
 
 
Thus, the object ‘VarJava’ can invoke the ‘Client’ class methods. The Client class 
calls the checking method of the RMI server called CheckInput() that is implemented 
as shown in Listing 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CheckInput() contains an assertion point that is used to communicate with 
Anatempura, and thus the input data will be transferred to Anatempura  for checking.  
$VarJava = new Java("Client"); 
$Result =$VarJava ->CheckValue($Value_for_Checking); 
 
 public String CheckInput(String sentvalue) throws RemoteException 
   {    try  { 
   Console c = System.console(); 
  String in ; 
  System.out.println("!PROG:assert V_check:"+sentvalue+":Timestamp :!\n"); 
  in = c.readLine("read it \n"); 
  System.out.println("Tempura Result:  "+in);   
  return in; 
} 
Listing 5.1 PHP script: Sending Value from PHP to Java 
 
Listing 5.2 Java Code: Checking Input Method 
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Anatempura receives the inputs using the get_var procedure. The input will be 
inspected using the CheckingModel procedure, and the result will be returned to the 
application Java using the  prog_send_ne(X) procedure as listed in Listing 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
The reason of using the Java RMI application is that Anatempura can start and 
monitor the Java application and it will communicate with the web application server 
(server to server).  
The web application’s variables and hotspot points are known as the application has 
been implemented for testing the effectiveness of Anatempura in monitoring 
submitted data against SQL injection Attacks. So, the Anatempura tool can be used 
to monitor an existing application as long as the application’s variables and hotspots 
are known beforehand. The detection of these variables and hotspots can be done by 
using an existing analysis tool like the Pixy tool (Jovanovic, Kruegel et al. 2006) for 
PHP applications.  
Therefore, extracted data is received by Anatempura and can be analysed by the 
input checker. Anatempura receives the data in array style and analyses the submitted 
data only and determines the status, i.e., whether it is safe or not. The analysis of the 
while (Loop = 1) 
    do { 
{get_var("V_check ", NewValue)  and  output(NewValue) and 
CheckingModel(X,NewValue) and stable(NewValue)}; 
 {prog_send_ne(X) and skip and   
 if (NewValue ='ex1') then Loop := 0 else Loop :=1 } 
 } 
Listing 5.3 Tempura Code: inspecting and Sending Data to Java 
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submitted data is based on the initial capture component that prepares the data before 
the analysis stage using two procedures as shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There are two preparation procedures which are: 
 Lowercase procedure  
 DecreaseSpaces procedure 
These procedures run in sequence for every transaction, and they utilize predefined 
functions like unascii which is used to give the corresponding character an ASCII 
value. For example, if the function called like unascii (57) the function will return the 
character ‘W’, and this function will be used in the lowercase function in the 
preparation procedure.  
Lowercase is one of the preparation functions and it is used to transform the user 
input into lower case.  Normally, when this function is called it starts with an input 
string and converts this string into a string of lower case characters using the ASCII 
code of input string characters. 
User 
submitting data
Preparation procedures
Lowercase function 
DecreaseSpaces function 
Analysis procedure
 
Figure 5.3 Preparing Procedures 
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DecreaseSpaces is a preparation function that is used to remove any extra spaces in 
the user input.  This function has two steps, the first one determines all non space 
characters in the string, and the next step is to restructure a sequence of characters in 
such a way that the extra spaces will be converted to one space character, and then 
the function will return this restructured string. The code of these functions is in the 
Appendix 3. 
5.3.2. The input Checker   
The input checker receives the prepared data from the capturing data component so 
that it can be analysed.  The analysis functions inspect the content of the inputs and 
determine if those inputs contain any form of SQL injection attacks. The first step of 
the input analysis splits the input tokens and it is followed by other procedures like 
SearchGenKeywords, GoodEntry and BadEntry as shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The Input Checker 
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The StringTokens function has two steps, the first step determines a non space 
character of the input string, and the second step divides the input string in an array 
of tokens which can be used to search for specific SQL Keywords.  This function 
uses the same technique as the DecreaseSpaces function. However, StringTokens 
differs in the second part during the restructuring of the parts of the string. Table 1 
shows an example of the first part of the function.  
 
 
The other part of the function transforms a string S into an array of keywords called 
‘A1’ that involves all tokens of string S. The result of the example will be 
 .  
The SearchGenKeywords function is used by the main two functions that analyse 
the user input which are GoodEntry and BadEntry procedures. When this function is 
called it searches for the most common SQL injection keywords that come after an 
SQL injection symbol like semi colon and single quotation. The function starts by 
transforming it into an array of token using the StringTokens function. The returned 
array of string tokens will be compared with common SQL keywords that can be 
used in a SQL injection attack, like ["select","drop","update","delete","alter", 
"create","union","declare","exec",”insert”] as part of the analysis of the user input.  
The comparison will be done between two arrays which are a string token array and a 
A1= [“‘”,”union”,”select”,”*”,”from”,”table”] 
 
‘  u n i o n  s e l e c t  *  f r o m  t a b l e 
 
0 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 
 
 
0 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 
 
 
Table 5.1 Input String S 
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common SQL keywords array and the result will be either ‘y’ for yes or ‘n’ for no.  
The SearchSpecKword function is used by the BadEntry function to compare the 
token that comes after the SQL symbol with a special token that is normally used 
after this symbol, like union after a single quotation. In other words, this function 
checks the input against existing attacks patterns that use a single quotation. The 
function has two input variables S and D.  Variable D is an array of the comparable 
tokens that will be used to check what comes after the SQL symbol.  The S variable 
is the part of the user input that comes after the SQL symbol. So, if the input is 
 , the S variable will be . This part of the 
user input is transformed into a list of tokens using the Q array.  Listing 5.4 shows 
the checking part of the function which compares the first token of Q with D that 
contains a possible injected keyword that can come after this SQL symbol.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function returns as result an array X = [A, G]. The G variable is used to return 
the length of list of the token Q that can be used to determine the remaining part of a 
string S, and A is a variable used for returning the comparison result. Moreover, the 
S = or  '1'='1   input =” any ' or  '1' ='1  “ 
stable(Q) and  I=0 and J=0 and A='n' and G=0 and  { 
while  I < |D|   
do{ if (D[I]=Q[0]) 
 then{I:=|D| and  skip and A:='y' and G:=|Q[0]|}  
 else { I:=I+1 and skip and A:=A and G:=G}  
Listing 5.4 Tempura Code: SearchSpecKword function 
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result of this function is determined to be ‘n’ or ‘y’ in the same way as the 
SearchGenKeywords function.  The result will be used in the next step of the input 
checking, namely the CheckingModel procedure (Listing 5.8). 
GoodEntry function is one of the main functions for analysing the user input and it 
is the first analysis stage that checks whether the user entry contains any SQL 
keywords that can be used in SQL injection attacks or not. The function has as input 
a normalized string and first checks for a hex encoded SQL injection technique by 
comparing the user input on the character level with a key of this type of injection 
like ‘0x ….’, if it is not matched the analysis process will continue checking for input 
characters in the range of ‘0 to 9’ and ‘a to z’ using an ASCII code. Additionally, 
there are some symbols that are considered safe, because they are not used  as a key 
in this attack, the safe symbols are shown in Table 5.2. 
Seq. Symbol Character ASCII code 
1.  space 32 
2.  ! 33 
3.  $ 36 
4.  . 46 
5.  : 58 
6.  ? 63 
7.  _ 95 
8.  £ 163 
         Table 5.2 Safe Symbols 
The choice of the above characters is because they can be used as part of user input 
when using a web application.  The analysis steps will be executed sequentially for 
each character, thus if any of the mentioned steps has a positive match the function 
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if ((S[I..I+2]= "--" and (I+2 <= |S|)) or 
(S[I..I+3]= "- -" and (I+3 <= |S|))) 
then{I:=|S| and A:='b'} 
else{A:=A and I:=I+1} and skip} 
will return ‘n’ which means the input is not safe.  
The BadEntry function is the second step of the analysis that checks user inputs and 
compare it against existing attack patterns. The function has several parts, one checks 
for the SQL injection keys such as a single quotation as a character delimiter, semi 
colon  as query delimiter, hash symbol  as comment delimiter and a back and 
forward slash with a star as a comment delimiter in addition of other encoded 
injection attacks.   
The part that checks if the input contains a double dash characters is as follows: 
 
 
  
The variable S contains normalized user input and the variable I is the index of the 
current user input character. The code shows that the checking of this part is based 
on comparison between the sequences of characters in S with double dash characters 
with or without space in between the double dash. If there is a matching then it will 
return ‘b’ which means the input is bad. Note in the loop the value of I should not 
exceed the length of S, so the last possibility to find the double dash comment will be 
|S| minus 3 or |S| minus 2 and that depends on the form of the double dash.  
The second part will check for SQL injection attacks using a single quotation using 
several steps; the first step is to check for a single quotation, the second step will 
check the token that comes after a single quotation, and the last step checks what 
Listing 5.5 Tempura Code: Checking for Double Dash Characters 
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comes after that token.   
The code below shows the second step to find the token written after a single 
quotation: 
 
This code checks for common tokens used to inject web applications after a single 
quotation. If SearchSpecKword returns that there is no matching, the loop will 
resume from the ‘I+1’ character of string S to check if there is another single 
quotation. If SearchSpecKword returns that there is a matching then what comes 
after this token will be checked using another string index D that starts from I+1 to 
|S| to save the value of I  if there is no matching. 
 
Note, the code above is checking for characters that can come after the injecting 
token and if there is a matching the entry will be considered as an attack and it will 
be rejected, because the mentioned characters and token are used in SQL injection 
attacks. 
The second part will check whether the input includes a semi colon and check for 
attacks that can be done using a semi colon. The process of the checking will be done 
in several steps, the first step checks for a semi colon, the second step will check the 
token that comes after a semi colon, the last step checks what comes after that token. 
While (D < |S|)  
do {if (S[D]= ";" or  S[D]="=" or S[D]= "-" or  S[D]="'" or S[D]=">" or S[D]="<" 
or  S[D..D+6]="select" or S[D..D+3]="all") 
SearchSpecKword(X,S[I+1..|S|],["union","or","and","group","order"]) 
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while (D < |S|)  
do {if (S[D]= ";" or S[D]= "#" or  S[D]= "--" or  S[D]="'" or  S[D]="*" or 
S[D..D+5]="table" ) 
The code below shows the second step to check the token after a semi comma using 
SearchSpecKword: 
 
The code above checks for tokens used to inject web applications after a semi colon. 
If SearchSpecKword returns that there is no matching, the loop will resume the 
checking process from the ‘I+1’ character of string S. If SearchSpecKword returns 
that there is a matching then it will check what comes after this token via string index 
D that starts from I+1 to |S| to save the value of I  if there is no matching as shown in 
the following:  
 
 
The code above checks for the character that comes after the injecting token and if 
there is a matching with any of those possible characters and token, the entry will be 
considered as an attack and it will be rejected, because the mentioned characters and 
token are used in SQL injection attack. 
The last part will check whether the user input contains any of the alternative 
encoded injection techniques using the most widely used encoding.  
 
 
 
SearchSpecKword(X,S[I+1..|S|], 
["select","drop","update","delete","alter","create","declare","bigen","exec"]) 
while I < |S| 
do{ if ((S[I..I+3]= " 0x" or S[I..I+3]= "(0x" or S[I..I+4]= "( 0x" ) and  
(((ascii(S[I+3])>= 48 and ascii(S[I+3])<=57) or (ascii(S[I+3])>= 97 
and ascii(S[I+3])<=102)) and  ((ascii(S[I+4])>= 48 and 
ascii(S[I+4])<=57) or (ascii(S[I+4])>= 97 and ascii(S[I+4])<=102))))  
 
Listing 5.6 Tempura Code: Checking for hexadecimal encoded injection 
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Listing 5.6 shows the code that is used to detect attacks that use a hexadecimal 
encoded injection. The idea of the mention code is to block strings that starts with 
zero followed by character x and after it the hex encoded SQL command. This 
checking step inspects the input for ‘0x’ and two characters that come after it, if the 
inputs characters have the ascii code from 48 to 57 (‘0’ to ‘f’) or from 97 to102 (A to 
F) which are the hexadecimal injection key the inputs will be rejected and it will be 
considered as a bad input.   
Additionally, there are other types of alternative encoded injection and these will be 
checked using the following: 
 
 
The code above checks for SQL injection used in:  
" char("   which is concatenating characters in ASCII code. Note, there are several 
forms of the mentioned characters to consider different cases of spaces that can be 
used to elude this checking. 
"select("  to catch  ‘select’ keyword that is entered with bracket as one token. 
"exec("    to catch  ‘exec’ keyword that is entered with bracket as one token. 
"%00"   is a null character that is used to confuse the checking process of the position 
of the token. 
if (S[I..I+6]= " char("  or S[I..I+7]= " char("  or S[I..I+5]= "char(" or S[I..I+6]= " exec("  
or S[I..I+5]= "exec(" or S[I..I+6]= "select(" or S[I..I+7]= "select (" or S[I..I+3]= "%00"  
or S[I..I+3]= "%2f" or S[I..I+3]= "%2a" or S[I..I+5]= "%252f" or S[I..I+5]= "%252a" ) 
Listing 5.7 Tempura Code: Checking for Alternative Encoded Injection 
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"%2a" and "%2f" which are used to encode the inline comment character using 
Unicode style to escape from the normal checking of the character ‘*’ or ‘/’. 
5.3.3. Behavioural Functions 
These functions investigate the relation between previous user inputs by checking the 
list of results that is created during the checking process. The list ‘H’ contains the 
submitted input, submission time, an IP address and status whether it is good, bad, or 
unknown. The behavioural functions implement the four possible relational attacks 
that are defined in Chapter 4. The code below shows the implementation of the first 
possibility which is the percentage of the bad, good or unknown  inputs. 
 
The variables ‘T’ and ’I’ have been used to count the percentage of bad and unknown 
inputs, and the good inputs can be calculated using these values.  
 
The second behavioural function will check for repeated IP addresses that are used 
by the attacker who inject a malicious code in the application. The first step will 
G=itof(T)*$100$/itof(|H|)  and  
 D=itof(I)*$100$/itof(|H|) and  
 format("the percentage of bad  inputs  is: %F \n ",G) and  
 format("the percentage of unspecified  inputs  is: %F \n",D) and  
 format("the percentage of good inputs  is: %F \n ",($100$-(G+D))) 
and empty} 
T=0 and I=0 and  for i<|H| do { 
   if H[i][1] ='b'  
   then {T:=T+1 and I:=I } 
   else {T:=T and if H[i][1] ='OB' then I:=I+1 else I:=I} 
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determine a bad input attempt using the information of array result ’H’:  
 
The variable D is an array used to register the IP of each bad input attempt, and the 
variable HH is an array used to register the array index of those attempts. The next 
step will remove the redundant IP addresses that are registered more than one time in 
the array D using the Filter () function which will return an array X which is an array 
D without duplicates. The X and HH arrays will be used to create the result that 
shows in order the IP and the submission time of the input.  
 
The code above uses several variables and two loops to create the ‘G’ array that is 
used to gather the result of related IPs.  The first loop uses ‘X[I]=H[HH[j]][0]’  
condition to check if the IP of array X is equal to the IP of array the ‘HH’ using the 
H result array of the analysis. The matching IP address will be collected in array T 
grouped by IP address. The result of this part is as follows: 
while I < |X|  do{   
 for j<|HH| do { stable (G) and stable I and  
   if X[I]=H[HH[j]][0] 
    then {T:=T+[H[HH[j]][3]]} 
    else {T:=T} and skip}; 
{T:=[] and I:=I+1 and  G:=G+[[X[I]]+[T]] and skip} 
for i<|H| do { 
if H[i][1] ='b' 
then{HH:=HH+[i] and D:=D+[H[i][0]]}   
else{HH:=HH and D:=D} 
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The third behavioural function will find a sequence of user inputs that is considered 
to be bad. This part uses the index of result array H to detect a sequence of three bad 
inputs and it will show the IPs and their submission time.  
 
The CheckingModel procedure is the sequential composition of all of the discussed 
functions as shown in Listing 5.8.  
 
 
define CheckingModel(X,S) = { 
  exists D,R,F,T,M:{ 
 {stable(S) and LowerCase(T,S)}; 
{stable(T) and  DecreaseSpaces(R,T)}; 
 {stable(R) and SearchGenKeywords(D,R)}; 
 {stable(R) and stable(D) and GoodEntry(F,R)}; 
 {stable(R) and  stable(D) and stable(F) and   
 {if (D='g' and F='g')  
  then{M='g' and empty} 
 else{BadEntry(M,R)}}}  and fin(X=M)} 
 }. 
if (H[i][1] ='b' and H[i+1][1] ='b' and H[i+2][1] ='b' and i~=0) 
  then {i>0 and if (H[i-1][1] ='b' and H[i][1] ='b' and H[i+1][1] ='b')  
      then{G:=G+[i+2]} 
      else{G:=G+[i]+[i+1]+[i+2]}} 
[IP1,[transaction times],IP2,[transaction times],….,IPn,[transaction times] 
Listing 5.8 Tempura Code: The CheckingModel Procedure 
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5.3.4. Implementation of Database observer 
This component deals with unknown input cases to exactly determine the response of 
the database engine regarding this type of user entry. The DB observer is developed 
to determine new attacks using the application development language to observe 
those unknown cases. The database observer monitors the transaction to check four 
conditions as follow: 
 Transaction type at runtime is the same as the expected one specified by the 
developer. 
 The transaction table name at runtime is the same as the expected one that is 
specified by the developer.  
 The transaction record number at runtime is the same as the expected number that is 
specified by the developer.  
 Transaction user type at runtime is the same as the expected one that is specified by 
the developer. 
 So, the DB observer will be implemented using the PHP language to monitor the 
conditions of DB observer that are explained in Chapter 4. To implement this part, 
each transaction should be enclosed by transaction delimiters as follows: 
 
The Begin function will be used to start the DB transaction.   
function Begin()  
{ 
mysql_query("BEGIN"); 
} 
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function rollback() 
{ 
mysql_query("ROLLBACK"); 
} 
 
The Commit function will be used to end the DB transaction in addition to save the 
data into the database.   
 
 
 
The Rollback function will be used to end the DB transaction and to cancel the 
execution of a database transaction. 
The mentioned functions will be used for the monitoring of each database observer 
condition.  
In this part we implement only two of the conditions as the other two can be done in 
a similar way. The chosen conditions are the condition of user type and the condition 
of record number. The recorded number of the execution can be checked using two 
PHP functions which are mysql_num_rows() and mysql_affected_rows(). The 
difference between those functions is that the mysql_num_rows() function will be 
used with the selection command whereas the other will be used with the 
modification command like delete, update etc. 
The user type will be run as a PHP session that starts when the user log in to the 
system, so at the login page there  no need to check this condition because the other 
function commit() 
{ 
mysql_query("COMMIT"); 
} 
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three condition are enough to check the transaction at this page, and it will be used in 
the other page of the application. The session can be initialized at the login page 
using the following script. 
 
5.3.5.  Implementation of Output Checker 
This component is used in the last step of the checking of the user input and it will 
block any message that contains details about the database structure or type. This 
component is implemented using the PHP language. The PHP program returns the 
error message of database using the mysql_error() function, and the error message 
number is returned by the mysql_errno() function. So, the mention functions will be 
used to block any unsafe messages as follows: 
 
This code illustrates how to replace a MYSQL DB engine message with one that 
does not indicate the DB type. For example, if the user enters a duplicate value in the 
DB, in this case the DB will respond to the user input by ‘ Duplicate entry 'User_a' 
for key 'UName'  ‘ and that shows the column name ‘UName’ of the users table. 
Using above code will change the message into ‘There is a duplicated Entry’. 
Moreover, the unchanged message indicates a MYSQL database engine. If the 
message appears like ‘unique constraint (%s) violated’ that means the database 
if (mysql_errno() == 1061) 
{ 
 echo “There is a duplicated entry  ”; 
} 
$_SESSION['username'] = $_post[“username”]; 
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switch (mysql_errno())  
{ 
    case 1064: 
        echo “Wrong entry try again! ”; 
        break; 
 
    case 1061: 
        echo “There is a duplicated entry”; 
        break; 
   
    default: 
       echo "Wrong entry try again";} 
engine is Oracle. In this case the output checker will hide the database message and 
replace it with another one to block any information that can indicate the DB type. 
Another scenario is if the attacker tries to gather some information about the database 
type (if possible), some wrong cases of SQL syntax will be used. Thus, the database 
engine will respond to those cases with a SQL syntax error. For example, if the input 
is “ or 1 = 1-- ” and the database type is MYSQL, this input is illegal syntax  but it 
will cause  a DB error as follows: 
“You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL 
server version for the right syntax to use near 'any'' at line 1”.  Error no: 1064  
Therefore, this type of message shows the DB type and it can be blocked by 
choosing another message as follows:   
 
One way to handle the different types of the DB error cases is by using the PHP 
switch statement as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
if (mysql_errno() == 1064) 
{ 
 echo “Wrong entry, try again!  ”; 
} 
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5.4. Summary 
This chapter presented the implementation of the DPF components and gave a 
detailed explanation of the implementation of each component and the relation 
between each of the DPF components. The selected implementation tools and 
programming languages are discussed with a justification of our choice. Moreover, 
the implementation of the Checking Module procedure in Tempura is explained in 
detail. The next chapter will discuss the feasibility of our implementation discussing 
the strengths and limitations of DPF. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Detection and prevention framework 
Evaluation 
Objectives 
 Discuss the evaluation criteria. 
 Provides several samples of user input and its expected result.  
 Presents and discussed the evaluation result of each DPF component. 
 Compare the DPF approach with the existing approaches. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapters 4 and 5 have discussed the research framework and the 
implementation of our approach DPF. Thus, the success of the goal of the research 
depends on the evaluation results and the successful execution of DPF components. 
This chapter will discuss the evaluation of DPF that checks the DPF effectiveness 
and the interaction between DPF components in addition to evaluate each component 
individually. The evaluation will be done using the Anatempura tool with a sample 
of user input. This chapter is organized as follows:  Section 6.2 discusses the 
evaluation criteria that will be used to evaluate DPF components.  Section 6.3 tests 
the interaction of different software used to test the DPF framework. Section 6.4 
presents the results of input checker examination and discusses various samples of 
input data as well.  Section 6.5 discusses the testing result of database observer 
component. Section 6.6 shows the testing results of the output checker component. 
Section 6.7 tests the behavioural functions by investigating related attacks and 
discusses their results. Section 6.8 compares the DPF evaluation results with some of 
the existing approaches. Finally, Sections 6.9 summarises this chapter.  
6.2. Evaluation Criteria  
Focusing on a special environment is required to evaluate the effectiveness of this 
research, and using specific criteria that specifies the successful measurement. 
Accordingly, we are focussing to choose same environment for the evaluation of our 
framework that is mentioned in the implementation chapter, i.e., using PHP as 
development language and MYSQL as database engine. In this part the effectiveness 
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of DPF will be measured for each DPF component using various samples of user 
input and we are looking to check the following:  
 The implementation feasibility. 
 The success of input checker using as measurement the rate of false positives 
and false negatives. 
 Handling of new attacks.  
 Matching of attacks behaviour. 
6.3. Real Web Application Testing 
This part tests the interaction of different software used to test the framework on a 
web application. The testing starts by booting the Java RMI server using Anatempura 
code as explained in Chapter 5. The Wamp server is also up and running. The testing 
will be done by submitting a sample of login page that contains two login fields.  
Figure 6.1 shows an example of a web application page that contains a user input 
sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Web Application Input Sample 
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The submitted data is being sent via PHP page to the Java RMI server and then to 
Anatempura.  The checking process for this page will run two times as this page 
contains two fields. Anatempura checks the user name field first and the password 
field second. The user name field has any user name, and the password is injected by 
SQL injection and thus these entries will be rejected and a feedback message will be 
sent to the user. Therefore, different types of inputs have been considered to check 
the leverage of the input checker component in catching the common SQL injection 
attacks.  The examination checks also the input checker ability for determining the 
safe input as there are several types of safe input that can be used by the user as 
normal entries. The data that is submitted from the web application will appear in the 
external tab of the Anatempura interface. Figure 6.2 shows the external tab page of 
the Anatempura interface. This tab page contains the RMI server starting messages, 
and the analysis results of submitted data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Booting of Java RMI Server and The Result 
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Note there are two values that are read as shown in Figure 6.3, which are the 
username and the password values. Therefore, each submitted value will be analysed 
separately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note in the case of good inputs the value will be hidden, but they appear here 
because of testing the application.  
6.4. Single Input Checking  
In this part the effectiveness of the input checker will be examined to measure its 
ability to analyse the user inputs. The evaluation is divided into three sections, the 
first section will check safe inputs and how the input checker deals with them. The 
second section discusses the ability of blocking attacks and the last section will 
discuss the limitation of the input checker. 
6.4.1. User Input Samples Testing 
The input checker component checks if the input contains any form of SQL injection 
attack. In addition, the user input can be also a safe input. The first testing involves 
samples that show possible types of safe input and shows the result of the input 
checker component during the analysis of these samples.  
 
Figure 6.3 Tempura Tab and the Analysis Result 
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Safe Inputs 
The following table contains input samples and the expected analysis result. The 
expected result is added with each input sample. 
Seq. Input sample and Expected result 
1  ["g","which better 'I don't know or 'may be'?? "]. 
2  ["g","I don't know , or  it''s will be fine. "]. 
3  ["g","'0"]. 
4  ["g","to apply visit http://www.dmu.ac.uk/home.aspx"]. 
5  ["g","user_input"]. 
6  ["g","user+input"]. 
7  ["g","us/er+09=2"]. 
8  ["g","username"]. 
9  ["g","I want (£5) or (7.5 $) to buy this ben."]. 
10  ["g","UserName"]. 
11  ["g","Daived starts his game at '6:30' am, and Ali normally start it at 7:00. "]. 
12  ["g","why you Do not send the paper?"]. 
13  ["g","emad_ss@hotmail.com"]. 
14  ["g","fahed@yahoo.com"]. 
15  ["g","' declare @nn"]. 
16  ["g","12/01/2012"]. 
17  ["g","12/feb/2012"]. 
18  ["g","12.12.2012"]. 
19  ["g","12-12-2012"]. 
20  ["g","exec @nn "]. 
21  ["g","1234567890"]. 
22  ["g","I do not know!! what is the reason of this?"]. 
23  ["g","hani.doody@hotmail.com "]. 
24  ["g","the 'dmu' website is: http://www.dmu.ac.uk/home.aspx"]. 
25  ["g","I got 50% in my math, and Aric Got 60%."]. 
26  ["g","input"]. 
27  ["g","my address is: flat2, 20 garden avenue Leicester post code: le2 4ee "]. 
Table 6.1 Samples of Good Input 
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Table 6.1 shows 27 samples of safe input, these samples contain in some cases some 
of the SQL injection keys such as semicolon and single quotation. The expected 
result for each sample is denoted by the ‘g’ character. These samples are saved in a 
file called GoodSample. The simulation has three steps; the first step determines the 
source file of the sample using ‘infile’ system command. The second step reads the 
file records and save them to an array using an extendable array as Anatempura reads 
the file recorded one by one. CheckingModelTest is a Tempura application that read 
these values and glues the expected result as shown in Listing 6.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Listing 6.1 The Code of Checking Model Test. 
Listing 6.1 shows that the values will be saved to an array called H that can be easier 
and more flexible to be accessed and checked.  
/* run */ define CheckingModelTest () = { 
exists X,S,H:{  
{set outfile="stdout"  and  set infile="GoodSample"  
and   list(H,0) and input X  and  while (X ~= 0) do  
{extend_list(H,X) and skip and next input X}}; 
{stable(H) and  for i<|H| 
do {{CheckingModel(S,H[i][1])}; { 
if S = H[i][0]  
  then{ format("\n Number %d done %t :  %t \n",i+1,S,H[i][1])} 
  else {format ("Conflict !  Number %d is %t  Expected %t for: %t 
",i+1,S,H[i][1],H[i][0]) } 
 and skip}} 
 } 
     }}. 
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CheckingModelTest analyses the sample value and compares the result with the 
expected result. If the result matches with a CheckingModelTest result, the 
application prints ‘done’ or if not the application print ‘Conflict’ and shows the 
analysis result. A good sample has been simulated and the result is shown in Figure 
6.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 The Analysis Result of Safe Input Samples 
Figure 6.4 shows the actual result produced by the input checker component. The 
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input checker can deal with different types of safe user input and the word done 
which means the expected results matches the actual result. 
According to the result in Figure 6.4, the samples with the number 16, 17, 18 and 19 
are date style and they are considered safe inputs despite their contents containing 
forward slash, dot and dash characters because there is only one sequence dash 
character and the forward slash is suspicious only if it is followed by star. 
Samples number 1 and 3 contain a single quotation and they are consider as safe 
input, as the single quotation is not followed by any of SQL injection keywords. 
Sample number 15 is slightly different to 1 and 3 because it is similar to a SQL 
injection attack.  The single quotation here is followed by the declare command and 
the danger of this command will be achieved if it comes after a semicolon. 
Moreover, samples 13 and 14 are an example of email address and they contain the 
‘at’ character that can be used with a stored procedure attack. They are considered as 
safe inputs because the ‘at’ character is not preceded with a SQL command like 
declare or exec. Therefore, the checking model checks the sequence of each 
character to avoid the cases of false positives in the analysis results.  
Tautology Attacks 
The second test of the checking model, checks its ability to catch and block various 
forms of SQL injection attacks. This test involves several samples of these forms. 
Some of these samples have more than one form of SQL injection as the SQL 
injecting attack can consist of one or more injection type. The first SQL injection 
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attack that will be checked is a tautology attack. The following sample illustrates the 
most common tautology attacks.  
Table 6.2 Tautology Attack Samples. 
Table 6.2 shows samples of using tautology attack.  The differences between these 
samples are by adding other characters that can change the attack form but they still 
will be dangerous and executed. The test run using the same scenario of simulation 
that is used with the good sample in the previous section as the sample value will be 
read from a file that has the input sample with its expected result.   Figure 6.5 shows 
the actual result that is produced by the checking model, the result is matched with 
the expected one and thus the checking model successfully caught this SQL injection 
type of attack. The result shows that sample number 1,2 and 3 are just a tautology 
attacks that starts with a single quotation and followed by the ‘or’ keyword and true 
condition statement.   Sample number 4 is a tautology attack with an extra space. The 
extra space will be removed and the injection code will be caught by the checking 
Seq. The input sample 
1  ["b","'or '1'='1"]. 
2  ["b","'or 'abc'='abc"]. 
3  ["b","' or '2'>'l "]. 
4  ["b","'    or   '1  '=  '  1"]. 
5  ["b","' %2f%2a */ or '1'='4"]. 
6  ["b","' %00 or '1'='1"]. 
7  ["b","' %00 o/*   nothing */r '1'='1"]. 
8  ["b","'or /*  no time or */ or '6'='2*3"]. 
9  ["b","'union select * from test1 where '4'='3+1"]. 
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model. As aforesaid in Chapter 5, the checking model inspects the input looking for a 
single quotation and then checks what comes after this character. Sample 5 is a 
logical incorrect query attacks mixed with alternative encoding attacks.  Samples 6, 7 
and 8 are mixed tautology and alternative encoding attacks. The checking model in 
this case blocks the injection based on the alternative encoded key character and it 
checks the input to find a percentage character followed by number and the slash that 
is followed by the star character. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samples number 9 is a union attack based on a tautology attack.  Samples 8 and 9 
have true condition statement that is based on integer expression.  The checking 
model will catch this attack as a union query attack because the injection starts with a 
single quotation and followed by the union keyword. Thus, the result shows that the 
 
Figure 6.5 The Analysis Result of Tautology Attack Samples 
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checking model is blocking these attack type successfully.  
Piggy-back Query Attacks 
The following sample will be used to check the effectiveness of the checking model 
for blocking piggy-back query attacks.   
Seq. The injection sample The effect 
1  
["b",';select 1,2,3 from users into  
dumpfile ‘/temp/anyfilename;# "]. 
SQL injection of select statement that can 
retrieve all user information.  
2  
["b",';drop table users cascade 
constraints;# "]. 
Injection of drop command to delete the user 
table. 
3  
["b",'; insert /* New user  */ into 
users values(2, 'u123','123 ');# "]. 
Adding new user to the application permitted 
users in addition to in line comment. 
4  
["b",'; %00 update users /* all user  */ 
set u_password= '123';# "]. 
Changing the users passwords.  
5  
["b",'; alter table users drop 
u_password;# "]. 
Changing the structure of the user table. 
6  
["b",'; create user /* database user */ 
dbu1 identified by ‘p123′;#"]. 
Add new user to database system. 
7  
["b",'; delete from /* any  */ users 
where u_name like '%Emad%' ;# "]. 
Delete the admin user from the user table. 
8  
["b",";declare  @sql_procedure 
;#"]. 
Defines a stored procedure.  
Table 6.3 Piggy-back Attack Samples 
Table 6.3 contains a sample of SQL injection attacks that are based on piggy-back 
attacks. Figure 6.6 shows the analysis result of the checking model for these samples. 
As aforesaid in Chapter 2, the idea of these attacks that adding a new query to the 
original query, so a semicolon character has been used to perform these type of 
attacks. Samples 1 to 7 are injected using a semicolon.  The checking model checks 
what comes after this character, if it is one of the existing attacks keywords then it 
will be blocked. As the result in Figure 6.6 is matched with the expected result that 
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means the checking model can block these types of attacks successfully. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Union Query Attacks 
Seq. The injection sample 
1  ["b","'union select * from users;#"].  
2  ["b","'union select * from tablename where 'q'='q "]. 
3  
["b","'Union select table_name, from information_schema.table into outfile 
'/www/file.txt'"]. 
4  ["b","'union select * from tablename %00 where 'q'='q "]. 
5  ["b","' %00 union select * from tablename %2f%2a    */ where 'q'='q "]. 
6  
["b","","' union select benchmark( 5552555, sha1( 'test' )) ss, ee from test1 where 
'1'='1 "]. 
7  ["b","'union all select 1,2,3,4 where 1=2 "]. 
Table 6.4 Union Query Attack Samples 
 
Figure 6.6 The Analysis Result for Piggy-back Attack Samples 
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Table 6.4 shows various styles of using the union keyword in SQL injection attacks. 
This injection type uses a single quotation as value delimiter and use the union 
command followed by the injection code. The checking model has tested the samples 
of Table 6.4 and the result is shown in the Figure 6.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 The Analysis Results for Union Attack Samples 
Union attacks as shown in Figure 6.7 can consist of more than one attack type like 
sample 7 that is similar to logical incorrect query. Samples 2, 4 and 5 are union and 
tautology attack including code of alternative encoding attacks. Sample 6 is a blind 
injection that causes a delay if injected successfully. The checking model has 
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detected these types of attacks, and the result matches the expected result.   
6.4.2. Input Checker Limitations 
The input checker component has been checked using various types of user input and 
multi forms of SQL injection attacks. The result matches with those of the expected 
results. However, these samples are not enough for the evaluation of the input 
checker component as they do not covered all possible input. Thus, there is a 
possibility of false negatives and false positives. False negatives were not found 
during the testing of this component despite using different attacks type.  However, 
the alternative encoding attacks has unlimited possibility. In the detection algorithm 
the common alternative encoding attacks has been handled based on the key of these 
attacks. For example, the function char is used to combine the character decimal 
code. The function char and the codes that start with ‘0x’ are being blocked in 
addition to the other alternative encoding attacks that are discussed in Chapter 5.  
Another limitation is that the checking component produces some false positives if 
the injection code contains the SQL injection key or the input start with one of the 
common SQL injection. For example, if the input contains single quotation followed 
by union keyword and then semi colon, the detection algorithm considers this code 
as an injection where it actually does not affect or damage the database. Thus, this 
case and other similar cases that start with injection are blocked as they can cause a 
database error.  
Another example is if input has a part that is similar to the SQL injection form like 
using a single quotation followed by the ‘or’ keyword and then anything, in this case, 
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the input checker will consider it an attack as shown in Figure 6.8.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5. DB Observer Testing 
As aforesaid in Chapter 4, the database observer is detecting unknown SQL injection 
attacks.  Chapter 5 discusses the techniques that control the session using three 
functions which are Begin, Commit and Rollback. Thus, any unknown session will 
be started with the Begin function and if it matches the database observer condition 
the function Commit will end the session, otherwise the session will end with the 
Rollback function. To check effectiveness of this component, we discuss a database 
sample and show how the database observer will deal with unknown injections. The 
results show the database condition values during the injection and without the 
injection. Figure 6.9 shows a result sample of the record number condition during the 
injection of the web page.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 False Positive of the Checking Result  
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Figure 6.9 shows an example of a login page that contains the SQL statement after 
the page is submitted. The page also contains the number of records that are affected 
using the submitted data which is similar to the database observer checking 
technique for the first checking condition. In this example, the submitted page 
returned 5 as record number which means the SQL injection code has run 
successfully. Thus, this data will be rejected and the initial capture specification will 
be updated. Note that the page has no checking of the submitted data as this example 
is for testing the database observer.   
Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 show examples of submitted pages that are accepted by 
the database observer component.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Database Observer Rejected Value 
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Figure 6.10 shows that the SQL statement has a value for the Pass field containing 
semicolon and plus characters. The value is not matched with existing attack patterns 
and it cannot be considered good because of its contents. However, the number of 
matching records is 1 which means that the SQL statement matches one record of the 
test1 table.  Thus, the data is compatible with the first condition of the database 
observer.  
Figure 6.11 shows an example of a SQL statement that has a value of password field 
that contains a semicolon followed by a bracket. However, the number of matching 
records is 0 which means that the SQL statement does not match with any record of 
the user table and therefore no records are affected by executing this statement.  
 
Figure 6.10 Database Observer Accepted Value Example 
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Thus, the data is secure and does not break the first condition of the database 
observer. 
In the examples of Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11, the new attacks will be analysed, 
than the new attacks specification will be added to the initial capture. Thus, the initial 
capture will be updated manually to deal with new cases that are found by the 
database observer.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Database Observer Accepted Value Example 2 
Similarly, the evaluation of the user type condition will be done. For example, if a 
web application has several user types and the user type is created when the user 
login as explained in Chapter 4, then the user cannot access and use any page without 
available session. In other words, the user will be blocked if (s)he tries to change the 
data that is not related to the session type.  
6.6. Output Checker Testing 
This component replaces the messages that come from the database with one that 
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does not contain any information about the database type or structure.  Figure 6.12 
shows an example of the database response to the injection code that is not executed 
successfully.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The injected code here is a single quotation followed by an ‘or’ SQL keyword. The 
error message shows information about the database type which is MYSQL. In 
Chapter 4, the replacement of the messages type has been discussed and 
implemented.  Figure 6.9 shows another message for same input.  
 
 
Figure 6.12 Sample of Web Application Page Error 
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Thus, the error has been replaced with another message and therefore the output 
checker has run successfully.  
6.7. Behavioural Functions Testing  
Testing of the user’s behaviour will be done by simulation in Anatempura only. The 
reasons of the simulation are because of the difficulty to collect the SQL injection 
data from various machines and to check the success of all user behaviour. Thus, the 
investigation simulates related attacks using a file that contains various types of user 
input. Each record in this file contains four values which are the IP address, the input 
sample and the time stamp of the submitted data that come from application server.  
 
Figure 6.13 Sample of Error Handling  
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The investigation of related records will be done in several steps. The first step 
uploads the file that contains the sample records to Anatempura using an extendable 
array as Anatempura reads the file records one by one.  The input of each record of 
the sample in this array will be analysed using the input checking component. The 
analysis result of each record will be added to the record and replace the expected 
result. Thus, the record will contain four values as follows 
 
 
 
As aforesaid in Chapter 4, the investigation of related user behaviour will be done 
according to four criteria which are the sequence of SQL injection attacks, the 
percentage of the transaction type, the related IP address, and the related store 
procedure attacks.  The following sample shows sample inputs: 
Seq. Input Samples 
1  ["192.168.1.2","which better I don't know, or say 'may be'?? ","Time 1:1","g"]. 
2  ["192.168.1.1","; declare @SQLProcedure","Time 1:2","b"]. 
3  ["192.168.1.6","'; drop table ","Time 1:3","b"]. 
4  ["192.168.1.12","' or 1=1 ","Time 1:4","b"]. 
5  ["192.168.1.1","12/feb/2012","Time 1:5","g"]. 
6  ["192.168.1.8","'union select @SQLProcedure ","Time 1:6","b"]. 
7  ["192.168.1.6","I don't know or it it''s will be fine. ","Time 1:7","g"]. 
8  ["192.168.1.1","to apply visit http://www.dmu.ac.uk/home.aspx","Time 
1:8","g"]. 
9  ["192.168.1.1","user_input","Time 1:9","g"]. 
10  ["192.168.1.1","user+input","1:10","g"]. 
["IP Address "," Input Sample", "Time"," The analysis result"]  
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11  ["192.168.1.2","; exec @SQLProcedure ","Time 1:11","b"]. 
12  ["192.168.1.6","us/er+09=2","Time 1:12","g"]. 
13  ["192.168.1.6","username","Time 1:13","g"]. 
14  ["192.168.1.6","I want (£5) or (7.5 $) to buy this ben.","Time 1:14","g"]. 
15  ["192.168.1.1","emad_ss@hotmail.com","Time 1:15","g"]. 
16  ["192.168.1.6","fahed@yahoo.com","Time 1:16","g"]. 
17  ["192.168.1.1","'or '1'='1","Time 1:17","b"]. 
18  ["192.168.1.6","' %00 or '1'='1","Time 1:18","b"]. 
19  ["192.168.1.4","' %2f%2a */ or '1'='1","Time 1:19","b"]. 
20  ["192.168.1.7","' %252f%252a */ or '1'='1","Time 1:20","b"]. 
21  ["192.168.1.1","' or exists (select * from test1) and ''='","Time 1:21","b"]. 
22  ["192.168.1.1","' or not equal to zero","Time 1:22","b"]. 
23  ["192.168.1.2","12/01/2012","Time 1:23","g"]. 
24  ["192.168.1.6","UserName","Time 1:24","g"]. 
25  ["192.168.1.5","12.12.2012","Time 1:25","g"]. 
26  ["192.168.1.1","12-12-2012","Time 1:26","g"]. 
Table 6.5 Behaviour Input Samples 
The test has two parts, the first one uses the input checker component because the 
creation of the behaviour runs in sequence and starts after the checking component, 
and the second one run uses the behavioural procedure. Figure 6.14 shows the 
analysis results of the sample inputs and Figure 6.15 shows the related behaviour of 
these samples. 
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Figure 6.14 Analysis Results of the Behaviour Input Samples 
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Figure 6.15 User's Behaviour Results 
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Figure 6.14 shows 26 cases of user input and the analysis result for these cases, the 
IP address for each case and the transaction time. These values have been 
investigated using the behavioural function and the result is shown in Figure 6.15 in 
4 parts. The first part contains the related bad cases that come from the same IP 
address. The result of this part displays the IP address followed by the sequence 
transaction times that are arranged in ascending order.  
The result of the second part shows the related attacks that run sequentially, and the 
behavioural function here checks for sequences of three attacks or more because the 
SQL injection attacks require at least three attempts to run the injection. The first 
attempt detects the database type. The second one finds the database structure, and 
the third one starts the exploit and attack the database. The result shows that the 
inputs number 2, 3 and 4 are related as they run sequentially. Another sequence is for 
the inputs number 18,19,20,21, and 22. Note the inputs in these attempts come from 
several IP addresses.  
The third part shows the percentage of each transaction type, i.e., good, bad, and 
unknown. The result shows the percentage of the three types of transaction whereas 
the bad transaction has a percentage of 38.46154, the unknown transaction equal 
3.84615 %, and the good transaction percentage 57.69231 which is not an acceptable 
value for any web application if that data is collected from a real web application, 
because if the percentage of the bad transaction is high then it means that this 
application is under attack.  Thus, the transaction percentage statistics can be used to 
produce an early warning for the system administrator about the attacks. So, if the 
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percentage of good transactions is 95%  that it can be considered as nearly safe 
because the  5 %  involves false positives cases and some unknown cases that can be 
handled with database observer in addition to some rejected cases of bad input. 
Therefore, the determination of the percentage of the system transactions is required 
to know the system states. And these percentage needs to be determined by the 
application administrator.  
The result of the last part shows the related attacks that are based on using the same 
stored procedure. Input number 2 is used to declare a stored procedure and input 
number 6 and 11 are used these procedure.   
Therefore, the result shows that the behavioural functions can detect related attempts 
of bad input such as presented in Chapter 4 and it has run successfully. The 
following section discusses some of the existing approaches and compares them with 
our approach. 
6.8. Related Work Comparison 
There are many studies and web application vulnerabilities scanning tools that tackle 
the problem of the SQL injection. Some of these studies are discussed in Chapter 2. 
DPF will not compared to the web application scanning tools like Nikto or Acunetix 
because they uses black box testing techniques and they deal with various of web 
application vulnerabilities. In this section, the DPF technique and its checking results 
will be discussed and compared with other studies that are proposed to block SQL 
injection attacks.   The comparison will be based on the following criteria:   
 Blocking all attacks type 
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 Using static analysis  
 Modifying code 
 Developer specification level 
 Producing false positives and false negatives 
 Runtime underlying logic 
In addition to the comparison criteria, the DPF differs from existing approaches as it 
can track attacks using behavioural functions, and it also block new attacks  by 
following database transactions using the database observer. The comparison will be 
divided in two tables because the information of comparison criteria is not available 
in some studies. The following table show the comparison result of some of the 
mentioned criteria.  
Approaches  Using static 
analysis 
Attacks 
specification 
Block exist 
attacks  
Tracking 
Attacks 
(Halfond, Orso 2006) Fully Automated All No 
(Wassermann, Su 2007) Fully Automated All No 
(Shrivastava, Bhattacharyji 
2012) 
No Manual  - 
Filter   
All No 
(Natarajan, Subramani 2012) yes Automated Some *1 No 
(Manikanta, Sardana 2012) Fully Automated All No 
(Lee, Jeong et al. 2012) Fully Automated All No 
DPF partly Manual All yes 
Table 6.6 Existing Approaches Comparison with the DPF (1) 
Table 6.6 shows some the existing approaches and the comparison information 
according to the criteria: ‘using a static analysis’, ‘attacks specification’ and ‘block 
*1, Union, Tautology and Logically Incorrect Query Attacks 
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existing attacks’. Some of the existing approaches analyse the code and simulate to 
find vulnerable contents, and others do not require the static analysis stage because 
they are based on filtering the inputs. The DPF assumes that static analysis is used to 
determine the hotspots of the application. The DPF attacks specification will be done 
manually because the detection specification needs to be specified in ITL.   
The second comparison information is shown in the following table.  
Approaches  Modifying 
code  
False 
Positive 
False 
negative 
Runtime 
monitoring 
Database 
Observer 
(Boyd, Keromytis 
2004) 
Yes No No No No 
(Halfond, Orso 2006) No Low No Yes  java 
based on  
NDFA 
No 
(Wassermann, Su 
2007) 
No low No No No 
(Shrivastava, 
Bhattacharyji 2012) 
No N/A N/A No No 
(Natarajan, Subramani 
2012) 
No N/A Yes Yes Java 
monitoring 
No 
(Manikanta, Sardana 
2012) 
No No No Yes using  
DB  
Firewall 
No 
DPF  Yes Low No Yes using  
Anatempur
a 
Yes 
Table 6.7 Existing Approaches Comparison with the DPF (2) 
Table 6.7 shows another comparison which is based on the criteria: ‘modifying 
code’, ‘false positives’, ‘false negatives’ and ‘using of runtime monitoring’. Some of 
the existing approaches modify the application code to apply their approach like 
(Boyd, Keromytis 2004)  as they need integrated software that can initialize and 
recollect the random number of each SQL keyword. The DPF requires little code 
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modification because of the assertion points that will be added to a web application 
code for each hotspot of runtime monitoring.  The most dangerous type of checking 
result is false negatives and false positives. False positives are limited as discussed in 
the evaluation of the input checker section. So according to the criteria using 
Anatempura as runtime monitoring is recommended. 
6.9. Summary 
This chapter presented the evaluation of the DPF components and discussed the 
evaluation result of each component. The evaluation of the input checker 
components had several stages of testing for most common and existing attacks 
which were using Anatempura and run time testing. The DPF component database 
observer and the output checker also have been evaluated and discussed. The 
behavioural functions are evaluated using a case study. The evaluation result shows 
that DPF has been implemented successfully. The next chapter will conclude this 
thesis and discuss the strengths and limitations of DPF in addition to the future work. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Objectives 
 Summarise the thesis. 
 Discuss the research limitations. 
 Highlight the contributions to knowledge of this research. 
 Discuss future work. 
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7.1. Summary of the thesis 
This thesis presented a new framework for the detection and prevention of SQL 
injecting attacks (DPF) that can detect existing and new attacks and investigate 
related SQL injection attacks at runtime. The DPF framework is based on ITL using 
its executable engine Tempura and its runtime monitoring tool Anatempura. The 
framework’s components are discussed showing how these components interact with 
each other to detect and prevent SQL injection attacks. Furthermore, the DPF 
consists of three checking components, i.e., the input checker component, the output 
checker component and the database observer component. The input checker 
monitors the user inputs for existing SQL injection attacks that are specified using 
ITL. The database observer checks database transactions of inputs that are tagged as 
unknown.  The output checker is used to check if the database messages contain any 
information about the database structures or type. Therefore, the checking process 
can deal with various types of user input. The investigation of related attacks uses 
also Anatempura and can construct the user behaviour via behavioural functions 
using the web transactions information like, user inputs, submission time and the IP 
address. 
The framework implementation is programmed using Tempura, Java, and PHP.  
Tempura is used to implement the detection formula and the behavioural functions.  
PHP is used to implement the database observer and the output checker.  Java is used 
as a bridge to transfer submitted data between the PHP application and the 
Anatempura tool. 
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The testing of the feasibility of DPF and the effectiveness of DPF components are 
done in several stages. The input checker is tested in two stages, the first one at 
runtime to check the interaction of various components (Section 6.3). 
The input checker is tested using various samples of user input. The samples contain 
examples of safe input and existing attacks patterns like tautology, piggy-back query 
and union attacks.  The effectiveness was measured by simulating sample inputs, 
using the Anatempura tool, and the simulation results were discussed. The 
effectiveness of the input checker in detecting existing attacks pattern was shown 
(Section 6.4). The database observer and the output checker were tested using 
different PHP pages that show various user input and the way these components deal 
with these cases was discussed (Section 6.5, Section 6.6).  
The user behaviour was tested using a case study that contains information about real 
transactions like IP addresses, the submission time and the input. This testing is 
performed using runs simulating the input behaviour with Anatempura. The 
behavioural function testing results showed that the investigation criteria of related 
attacks are successful.  Finally, the DPF framework is compared with existing 
approaches that are proposed to detect SQL injection attacks. 
7.2. Contribution 
This research makes the following contributions: 
 New framework for detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks (Section 
4.2). 
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 Runtime detection: using a runtime verification technique based on Interval 
Temporal logic detecting various types of SQL injection attacks (Section 4.4.1). 
 Database observer: to detect possible new injection attacks by monitoring 
database transactions (Section 4.4.2).  
 User’s behaviour: investigates related SQL injection attacks using user input, and 
providing early warning against SQL injection attacks (Section 4.5.2). 
7.3. Success Criteria Revisited 
Success criteria have been proposed in Chapter 1 to judge the success of the research. 
The following will revisit those criteria to measure the success of this research.  
 The framework can detect and prevent existing SQL injection attack types.   
The framework architecture has been discussed in Chapter 4 and there are three 
checking components that can check the user inputs. Chapter 5 discussed the 
implementation of these components.  Chapter 6 has discussed several samples of 
user input that contains good and bad inputs. The result showed the input checker’s 
ability to detect and prevent existing SQL injecting attack types.  Thus, this 
framework has been successful in detecting and blocking the existing SQL injection 
attacks.  
 The runtime verification tool is suitable for monitoring the web application. 
In Chapter 3, the Anatempura and its features have been discussed. An overview of 
using Anatempura in the DPF framework is discussed as well. Section 6.3 
highlighted a runtime example that shows how the Anatempura deal with web 
transactions. Anatempura can monitor attacks specification, and there are several 
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samples of user input that were discussed, and that show the effectiveness of 
Anatempura in the detection of various types of inputs (Section 6.4). Therefore, 
using Anatempura is recommended for monitoring a web application.  
 The framework can detect new types of SQL injection attack.  
One of the contributions in this research is that it uses the database observer which 
can detect a new SQL injection attack by monitoring the unknown input and 
determining whether the input is safe or not. Chapter 6 has discussed several cases 
that use a database observer showing the effectiveness of this component. The result 
of these cases showed the database observer’s ability to catch and block new attacks.   
 ITL is suitable to model attack behaviour.  
Attacks behaviour component tracks the user over several states and determines 
related states. The web transaction data, such as the user input and others, have been 
used to investigate this relation. Chapter 4 discussed the conditions that are proposed 
to investigate this relation, and Chapter 5 showed the implementation of the 
behavioural function using Tempura. Chapter 6 discussed the result that is achieved 
based on a real web application. The results supported our choice for ITL to model 
attacks behaviour as all proposed conditions were successfully realized.  
7.4. Limitations 
As aforesaid in Chapter 6, the evaluation results of the proposed framework are 
similar to the expected result of each test sample. Thus, the framework can detect the 
existing and new SQL injection attacks, in addition to modelling attacks behaviour. 
However, the framework has the following limitations. 
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 Production of false positives and the possibility of false negatives.  
This part is discussed in Section 6.4.2, and the reason for the false positives is that 
the injection code contains the SQL injection key or starts with one of the common 
SQL injections. False negatives can be produced because of the alternative encoding 
attacks having unlimited possibilities. Furthermore, to discuss the rate of false 
positives and false negatives would require a comprehensive benchmark that 
includes all existing SQL injection attacks techniques in addition to possible safe 
inputs. Such a benchmark does not exist at the moment. 
 Manual addition of the specification of new attacks.  
The initial capture component that contains the attacks specification is now manually 
updated because of the new attacks that needs to be analysed first then its 
specification will be added to the detection formula.  However, Anatempura can 
update the attacks specification automatically but that requires further research. 
7.5. Future work 
As stated in Chapter 2, the detection of SQL injection attacks is based on the DBMS 
type that is used within a web application because the SQL injection code should be 
compatible with the DBMS type to run the injection successfully. Currently, the 
detection technique is tested for the MYSQL database type and the testing results 
showed the effectiveness of the checking components. The limitation of the input 
checker component is discussed showing some examples of false positives and the 
reasons for these cases. In addition, because the alternative encoding technique is 
unlimited, so, there is a possibility of false negatives. Thus, the future work will 
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focus on the following: 
 Improve the detection technique and develop the ability to check the SQL 
injection attacks for other database types. 
 Improve the detection formula to reduce the false positive cases, and do more 
investigation of the alternative encoding attacks to check that the input 
checker component can detect more of these types of attacks. 
 The related attacks can now be investigated based on four conditions; further 
research can establish other conditions. 
 Improve the investigation of related attacks so that the input checker 
component can predict the next steps of attacks. 
 Improve the updated of detection formula of the existing attacks to be run 
automatically. 
 Further research to specify XSS attacks and the way to add its specification to 
the detection formula.  
 Check the DPF ability to detect and protect the SQL injection vulnerabilities 
that are mentioned in CVE entries (MITRE 2013).   
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import java.util.*; 
import java.text.*; 
import java.rmi.NotBoundException; 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry; 
import java.rmi.registry.Registry; 
public class Client 
{ 
public static String input; 
private static Registry r; 
private static Server server; 
public static String CheckValue(String res)  throws Exception 
        { 
        String recive; 
        recive = server.CheckInput(res); 
        return recive; 
      } 
public static void main(String args[]) throws Exception 
   { System.out.println("Starting up Client ...."); 
     r = LocateRegistry.getRegistry("127.0.0.1");  
    server= (Server) r.lookup("Server"); 
    System.out.println("Welcome "); 
    Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in); 
     do { 
         System.out.println("Please Enter the string you like to check:"); 
          input = in.nextLine(); 
          }while(input==null); 
         System.out.println(CheckValue(input));    
     }    
} 
 
Appendix 1: Java Code 
Client.Java 
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The client, server and serverimpl files are used to transfer a submitted data from PHP 
page to Anatempura tool.   
The client class is used to test the CheckInput function in the server file as this 
function communicates with Anatempura using an assertion points.  
Server.java 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The server file is used to define the function that can be used by the client to 
communicate with serverimpl that is used to implement the CheckInput function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
import java.rmi.Remote; 
public interface Server extends Remote 
{ 
public String CheckInput(String sentvalue) throws 
java.rmi.RemoteException; 
} 
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ServerImpl.Java 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This file implements the CheckInput function that includes the assertion point. The 
assertion point will be used to deliver a submitted data to Anatempura and the 
checking result will be returned using the Console class which is one of the Java 
system libraries. 
 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import java.rmi.RemoteException; 
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry; 
import java.rmi.registry.Registry; 
import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject; 
 
public class ServerImpl implements Server 
{ 
   public String CheckInput(String sentvalue) throws RemoteException 
        {     try{ 
        Console c = System.console(); 
        String in ; 
       System.out.println("!PROG: assert Name:"+sentvalue+":9:!\n"); 
       in = c.readLine("read it \n"); 
       System.out.println("Tempura Result:  "+in); 
       return in; 
       } catch(Exception e) 
       { 
        System.out.println("Server data erro:"); 
        e.printStackTrace(); 
        return null; 
        } 
    } 
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Appendix 2: PHP Code 
TestDatabaseObserver.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<head> 
  <title>PHP Injection test</title> 
 </head> 
 <body> 
 <form action="TestDatabaseObserver.php" method="post"> 
<p>UserName <input type="text" name="textfield" /></p> 
<p>PassWord <input type="text" name="textfield2"/></p> 
<p><input type="submit" name="Submit" value="Submit" /></p> 
<?php  
define ("DB_HOST", "localhost"); // set database host 
define ("DB_USER", "root"); // set database user 
define ("DB_PASS",""); // set database password 
define ("DB_NAME","emad"); // set database name 
$link = mysql_connect(DB_HOST, DB_USER,DB_PASS); 
$db = mysql_select_db(DB_NAME, $link) or die("Couldn't select database"); 
if (!$link) {  die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error()); } 
echo 'Connected successfully'; 
echo '<p><font size="4">==========================</font></p>';  
if (isset($_POST['textfield'])) 
{ if(isset($_POST['textfield2'])) 
{     $user=$_POST["textfield"]; 
      $pwd=$_POST["textfield2"]; 
   $ee="select * from test1 where ee='$user' and UPass='$pwd'"; 
   echo '<p><font size="4">SQL statment:</font></p>';  
   echo $ee; 
   $result = mysql_query($ee) or die ("<p>Wrong entry try again!");  
    echo '<p><font size="4">Number of record: 
</font></p>'.mysql_num_rows($result);}} 
mysql_close($link); 
 ?> 
 </form> </body> </html> 
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The TestDatabaseObserver.php file will be used to test the records number condition 
using mysql_num_rows($result) that can retrieve the matching record numbers of a 
select statement. 
TestDatabaseObserverInsert.php 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
function begin()  
{ mysql_query("BEGIN");} 
function commit() 
{@mysql_query("COMMIT");} 
function rollback() 
{@mysql_query("ROLLBACK");} 
if (isset($_POST['textfield'])) 
{ if(isset($_POST['textfield2'])) 
{ $user=$_POST["textfield"]; 
  $pwd=$_POST["textfield2"]; 
  begin();  
  $query = "INSERT INTO test1(ee,UPass) values('$user','$pwd')"; 
  echo '<p><font size="4">SQL statment:</font></p>';  
  echo $query; 
  $result = mysql_query($query) or die ("<p>Wrong entry try again!");  
  $RowNo = mysql_affected_rows(); 
  echo '<p><font size="4">Number of inserted record: </font></p>'.$RowNo; 
  if ($RowNo=1) 
  {  commit();} 
  else  
  { rollback(); 
   echo '<p><font size="4">Wrong entry</font></p>'; 
  } 
}} 
mysql_close($link); 
 ?> 
</form></body></html> 
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The TestDatabaseObserverInsert.php file has same database connection procedure 
that is used in a TestDatabaseObserver.php file. This is used to test the record 
number with an insert statement using mysql_affected_rows() that can retrieve the 
effected record numbers of the insert statement. 
TestOutput.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The TestOutput.php file is used to test the output checker that checks the message 
content and block any database information using a switch case command.  
 
if (isset($_POST['textfield'])) 
{ if(isset($_POST['textfield2'])) 
{    $user=$_POST["textfield"]; 
      $pwd=$_POST["textfield2"]; 
   $ee="select * from test1 where ee='$user' and UPass='$pwd'"; 
   echo '<p><font size="4">SQL statment:</font></p>';  
   echo $ee; 
   $result = mysql_query($ee); 
if (mysql_errno()) 
{switch (mysql_errno())  
{ case 1064: 
        echo '<p><font size="4">syntax error try again! </font></p> '; 
        break; 
    case 1061: 
        echo '<p><font size="4">There is a duplicated entry </font></p>'; 
    break; 
     default: 
       echo '<p><font size="4"> Wrong entry try again </font></p> ';}} 
    else { echo '<p><font size="4">Number of record: 
</font></p>'.mysql_num_rows($result);} 
  }} 
mysql_close($link); 
 ?> </form>  </body> </html> 
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Appendix 3: Tempura Code 
Anascii Function 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used to return the Ascii code for any character and it.  
LowerCase function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This procedure is used to transform all the character in a lowercase.  
define codes = " !\"#$%&'()*+,-
./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_`abcdefghijklm
nopqrstuvwxyz{|}~". 
define anascii(X) = { 
 if X>=32 and X<=126 then { codes[X-32] } else { "===" } 
}. 
 
define  LowerCase(X,ReceiveString)= {   /* X will be used for return variable*/ 
exists A2,A1:{stable (ReceiveString) and List(A2,|ReceiveString|) and A2=[] and 
 { for i < |ReceiveString|  
 do{             
 A2:=A2+[ascii(ReceiveString[i])] and skip } };{ 
 A1="" and stable(A2) and stable(ReceiveString) and  
 { for i < |ReceiveString|  
 do{  
 if (A2[i]>=65 and  A2[i]<=90)  
 then {A1 := A1 + anascii(A2[i]+32) and skip } 
 else {A1:=A1+ReceiveString[i] and skip }}}  and  fin(X=A1) 
  }} 
}. 
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DecreaseSpaces function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function has been used to reduce the number of sequence spaces to be one 
space. 
StringTokens function  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used to separate the string into tokens. 
define DecreaseSpaces(X,S) = { 
  exists A1,A2,E : { List(A2,|S|) and stable(S) and A2=[] and { 
for i < |S| do{ 
if S[i]~=" " 
 then  {A2:=A2+[i] and skip  }  
else {skip and  A2:=A2}}}; 
 {stable(S) and stable(A2) and A1 ="" and E=A2[0] and  
  for i < |A2|-1 do{ 
            if (A2[i+1]-A2[i]=1)  
  then{ stable(A1) and E:=E and  skip } 
  else{ A1 :=  A1+S[E..A2[i]+1]+" " and  E:= A2[i+1]  and  skip} 
   } and fin(X=A1+S[E..A2[|A2|-1]+1])  
     } 
   } 
  }. 
define StringTokens(X,S) = { 
exists A1,A2,E : { List(A2,|S|) and stable(S) and A2=[] and { 
for i < |S| do{ 
if S[i]~=" " then  {A2:=A2+[i] and skip  } else {skip and  A2:=A2}}}; 
 {stable(S) and stable(A2) and List(A1,|S|) and A1 =[] and E=A2[0] and  
 for i < |A2|-1 do{ 
                 if (A2[i+1]-A2[i]=1)  
  then { A1:=A1 and E:=E and  skip } 
  else{ A1:= A1+[S[E..A2[i]+1]] and  E:= A2[i+1]  and  skip} 
    } and fin(X=A1+[S[E..A2[|A2|-1]+1]])  
       } 
     } 
    }.  
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SearchGenKeywords function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function has been used to check if the string contains any SQL keywords.  
SearchSpecKword  function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used to check if the string contains a specific SQL keyword. 
 
define SearchGenKeywords(X,S) = { 
 exists A,I,J,SQLKeys:{{ 
 StringTokens(X,S) and fin(T=X)};{  
 stable(T) and  
 SQLKeys=["select","drop","update","delete","alter","create","union","declare",
"bigen","exec","ascii"]  
 and stable(SQLKeys) and I=0 and J=0 and A='g' and { 
 while  I < |SQLKeys| 
  do{ while J < |T| 
       do{  
   if (SQLKeys[I]=T[J]) 
    then {I:=|SQLKeys| and J:=|T| and  skip and A:='n'}  
    else {I:=I and skip and J:=J+1 and A:=A} 
     };{ I:=I+1 and  J:=0 and skip and A:=A } 
     } and fin(X=A)  
    }  }  }  }.  
define SearchSpecKword(X,S,D) = { 
 exists A,I,Q,G:{stable (D) and stable (S) and { 
 {StringTokens(Q,S)}; 
 {stable(Q) and I=0 and J=0 and A='n' and G=0 and  { 
  while  I < |D| 
   do{if (D[I]=Q[0]) 
    then {I:=|D| and  skip and A:='y' and G:=|Q[0]|}  
    else { I:=I+1 and skip and A:=A and G:=G} 
     }   
     }and fin(X=[A,G])    } } } }.  
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StringCommentCut function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function can be used to filter a string from the comment that can be used to 
elude from the detection function. 
GoodEntry function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
define StringCommentCut(X,S) = { 
  exists A1,A2,T,B : { List(A1,|S|) and stable(S) and A1=[] and T=0 and  B=0 and { 
for ( i < |S| )  
 do{if (S[i..i+2]= "/*" and T=0) 
  then {T:=1 and B:=i and A1:=A1}  
  else { if (S[i..i+2]= "*/" and T=1 ) 
   then { A1:=A1+[B]+["s"]+[i+1] and T:=0 and B:=B} 
   else {A1:=A1 and T:=T and B:=B}} and skip }}; 
{ stable(S) and stable(A1) and A2="" and  
 if |A1|>0  
 then {for (i<|A1|) 
 do{if A1[i]="s"  
 then {  if (|A2|=0) 
          
 then {A2:=S[0..A1[i-1]]+S[A1[i+1]+1..i+1]+S[A1[i+1]+1..A1[i+2]]}  
          
 else { if ((i+2)=|A1|)  
then{ A2:=A2+S[A1[i+1]+1..i+1]+S[A1[i+1]+1..|S|]}  
  else{ A2:=A2+S[A1[i+1]+1..i+1]+S[A1[i+1]+1..A1[i+2]]}  }} 
 else {A2:=A2} and skip}} 
 else {A2:= S and skip} 
   }and  output (S) and fin(X=A2) 
      }}.  
define GoodEntry(X,S)={ 
exists A,I:{  
   stable(S) and A='g' and I=0 and  while I < |S| do { 
   if (S[0..2]='0x' or  S[I..I+3]=" 0x") 
  then {I:=|S| and A:='n' and skip} 
  else {if  (ascii(S[I])>= 97  and ascii(S[I])<= 122)  
   then { stable(A) and I:=I+1 and skip} 
   else {if  (ascii(S[I])>= 48 and ascii(S[I])<=58) 
       then {stable(A) and I:=I+1 and skip} 
       else {if (ascii(S[I])= 32 or ascii(S[I])= 33 or ascii(S[I]) = 63 
or ascii(S[I]) = 95 or ascii(S[I]) = 43 or ascii(S[I]) = 61) 
 then {stable(A) and I:=I+1 and skip} 
 else {next(A)='n' and I:=|S| and skip }}}}} /*return n means not good entry*/ 
    and fin (X=A)  
}}.   
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BadEntry function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
define BadEntry(X,S)={ 
exists A,D,I,F,G: { 
{stable(S) and stable(struct(S)) and  A='u' and I =0 and 
  while I < |S|  
do{ if ((S[I..I+2]= "--" and (I+2 <= |S|)) or (S[I..I+3]= "- -" and (I+3 <= |S|))) 
  then{I:=|S| and A:='b'} 
  else{A:=A and I:=I+1} and skip}}; 
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}}; 
{stable(S) and  
while I < |S| 
do{ if (S[I..I+2]= "/*" and (I+2 < |S|)) or (S[I..I+3]= "/ *" and (I+3 < |S|)) 
 then{ D=I+2 and  
  while (D < |S|) 
   do {if (S[D..D+2]= "*/" or S[D..D+3]= "* /") 
    then {I:=|S| and A:='b' and skip and D:=|S|} 
    else {I:=|S|and A:='u' and skip and D:=D+1}}} 
          
 else{ if (S[I..I+2]= "/*" and (I+2 >= |S|)) or (S[I..I+3]= "/ *" and (I+3 >= |S|))  
  then{I:=|S| and A:='b' and skip and D:=|S|}  
else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}}}; 
        
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}}; 
{stable(S) and {   
 while I < |S| 
 do{   
 if (S[I]= ";" and I+1<|S|) 
 then{{stable (A) and stable(I) and   
 {SearchSpecKword(N,S[I+1..|S|],["drop","alter","create","declare"]); 
  stable N and 
SearchSpecKword(X,S[I+1..|S|],["select","update","bigen","exec","delete","insert"])}}; 
{if N[0]= 'y'  
  then {A:='b' and I:=|S| and stable X} 
  else {stable X and stable (A) and stable(I)} and skip}; 
{D=I+X[1]+1  and   
 if X[0]='y' 
then{while (D < |S|)  
do {if (S[D]= ";" or S[D]= "#" or  S[D]= "--" or  S[D]="'" or S[D..D+2]=" @" or 
S[D]="*" or S[D..D+5]="table" or S[D]="#"  or S[D..D+1]="/*") 
 then {A:='b' and skip and D:=|S| and I:=|S|} 
 else {A:='OB' and skip and D:=D+1 and I:=|S|}}} 
else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}} 
else{if (S[I]= ";") and (I+1 >= |S|) 
then{I:=|S| and A:='b' and skip}  
else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}}}}; 
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BadEntry part2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The GoodEntry function checks if the string contains any SQL keyword or symbols 
The BadEntry function checks the string if contains any of the exiting SQL injection attacks.  
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}}; 
{stable(S) and {  
 while I < |S| 
do{ if (S[I]= "'" and I+1<|S|) 
  then{{stable (A) and stable(I) and 
SearchSpecKword(X,S[I+1..|S|],["union","or","and","group","order"]) }; 
{ D=I+X[1]+1  and  if X[0]='y' 
then{while (D < |S|)  
do {if (S[D]= ";" or S[D]="," or S[D]="=" or S[D]= "-" or S[D]="%" or 
S[D]="'" or S[D..D+3]="all" or S[D]="#"  or S[D..D+1]="/*" or  
S[D]=">" or S[D]="<" or  S[D..D+6]="select" ) 
 then {A:='b' and skip and D:=|S| and I:=|S|} 
 else {A:='OB' and skip and D:=D+1 and I:=|S|}}} 
 else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}} 
 else{if (S[I]= "'") and (I+1 >= |S|) 
  then{I:=|S| and A:='b' and skip}  
  else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}}}}; 
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}}; 
{stable(S) and  
while I < |S| 
do{ if ((S[I..I+3]= " 0x") and  
 (((ascii(S[I+3])>= 48 and ascii(S[I+3])<=57) or (ascii(S[I+3])>= 97 and 
ascii(S[I+3])<=102)) and  
 ((ascii(S[I+4])>= 48 and ascii(S[I+4])<=57) or (ascii(S[I+4])>= 97 and 
ascii(S[I+4])<=102))))  
 then{I:=|S| and skip and  A:='b'} 
 else{A:=A and skip and  I:=I+1}}}; 
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}}; 
{stable(S) and 
while I < |S|   
 do{if (S[I..I+6]= " char("  or S[I..I+7]= " char (" or S[I..I+5]= "char(" or 
S[I..I+6]= " exec("  or S[I..I+5]= "exec(" or S[I..I+6]= "select(" or S[I..I+6]= " select(" 
or S[I..I+3]= "%00" or S[I..I+3]= "%2f" or S[I..I+3]= "%2a" or S[I..I+5]= "%252f" or 
S[I..I+5]= "%252a" )  
 then{I:=|S| and skip and A:='b'} 
 else{A:=A and skip and I:=I+1}}}; 
{stable(S) and skip and if (A ='b') then{A:=A and  I:=I} else{A:=A and I:=0}};
 {stable(S) and if A='u' then A:='g' else A:=A and skip} 
 and fin (X=A) 
  }}.    
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extend_list function 
 
 
 
This function is used to increase the size of the array and add new element to this array.  
Filter function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used by a behavioural function to remove a repeated IP address 
SearchProcedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is to check if there are frequent uses of a specific procedure.     
define extend_list(L,d) = { 
    list(next L, |L|+1) and  
          forall i<|L|+1: if i<|L| then L[i]:=L[i] else L[i]:=d 
}. 
define Filter(X,N) = { 
     exists A,T:{ 
  {List(A,|N|) and A=[] and List(T,|N|) and  
             while (|N| ~=0 ) do{ 
                 {A:=A+[N[0]] and N:=N[1..|N|] and skip}; 
                 {stable A and stable N and 
                   T=[] and  for i<|N|  
do { if  N[i] ~=A[|A|-1] 
                     then {T:=T+[N[i]]} 
                     else {T:=T} and skip };{N:=T and stable A and skip} 
                 } } and fin(X=A)       }    }}. 
   
      
define SearchProcedure(X,S,N) = { 
exists A,I,J,DProcedure:{{  
StringTokens(T,S)}; 
{stable(T) and DProcedure=["declare","select","exec"]  
and stable(DProcedure) and I=0 and J=0 and List(A,|T|) and A=[] and { 
 while  I < |DProcedure| 
  do{ while J < |T| 
  do{if (DProcedure[I]=T[J]) 
  then {if  T[J+1][0..1] ="@" then {I:=|DProcedure| and J:=|T| and  skip 
and A:=A+[N]+[DProcedure[I]]+[T[J+1]]}}  
  else {I:=I and skip and J:=J+1 and A:=A}}; 
{ I:=I+1 and  J:=0 and skip and A:=A} 
  } and fin(X=A)   }}}}.   
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ReltedIP function  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used by a behavioural function to find related IP address that is matched 
with existing attacks. 
CheckingModel procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This procedure is used to check if the string contains any form of SQL injection 
attack. 
define ReltedIP(H) = {      
exists I,X,T,HH,D: { 
{stable(H) and { List(HH,|H|) and HH=[] and List(D,|HH|) and D=[] and 
for i<|H| do {if H[i][1] ='b' 
  then{HH:=HH+[i] and D:=D+[H[i][0]]}   
  else{HH:=HH and D:=D} and skip}}; 
{ stable HH and stable H and Filter(X,D)}; 
{List(T,|HH|) and T=[] and I=0 and  stable HH and stable H and stable X  
and while I < |X|   
do{  for j<|HH| do { stable I and  
   if X[I]=H[HH[j]][0] 
 then {T:=T+[H[HH[j]][3]] } 
 else {T:=T} and skip};{T:=[] and I:=I+1 and  format("%t \n",[[X[I]]+[T]])  
  and skip}}}}}}.   
define CheckingModel(X,S) = { 
  exists D,R,F,T,M:{ 
 {stable(S) and LowerCase(T,S)}; 
 {stable(T) and  DecreaseSpaces(R,T)}; 
 {stable(R) and SearchGenKeywords(D,R)}; 
 {stable(R) and stable(D) and GoodEntry(F,R)}; 
 {stable(R) and  stable(D) and stable(F) and   
 {if (D='g' and F='g')  
 then{M='g' and empty} 
 else{BadEntry(M,R)}}}  and fin(X=M)} 
}. 
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Behavioural function  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function has been run in several stages to investigate related attacks. 
 
efine BuildBehaviour(H) = {      
exists I,X,T,HH,G,D: { 
{stable(H) and  
{ ReltedIP(H)   and format("\n*********Related IP with bad input ********\n\n")} ; 
{  format("************ Sequance of bad input ***************\n\n") and   
if |H|>2  
    then {List(G,|H|) and G=[] and  
for i<|H|-2 do {if (H[i][1] ='b' and H[i+1][1] ='b' and H[i+2][1] ='b' and i~=0) 
  then { if (H[i-1][1] ='b' and H[i][1] ='b' and H[i+1][1] ='b') and i>0  
     then{G:=G+[[H[i+2][0]]+[H[i+2][3]]]} 
     else{G:=G+["\n Seq. Attack: 
"]+[[H[i][0]]+[H[i][3]]]+[[H[i+1][0]]+[H[i+1][3]]]+[[H[i+2][0]]+[H[i+2][3]]]+["\n"]}
} 
  else{G:=G} and skip} and fin(output(G) and format ("\n \n "))} 
  else{empty}}; 
{format("*********** Percentage of all  input  *********\n\n") and 
T=0 and I=0 and   
for i<|H| do {  
 if H[i][1] ='b'  
  then {T:=T+1 and I:=I } 
  else {T:=T and if H[i][1] ='OB' then I:=I+1 else I:=I} 
  and skip}}; 
{stable(T) and stable(I)  and 
G=itof(T)*$100$/itof(|H|)  and  D=itof(I)*$100$/itof(|H|) and  
format("the percentage of bad  inputs  is: %F \n",G) and  
format("the percentage of unspecified  inputs  is: %F \n",D) and  
format("the percentage of good inputs  is: %F \n\n\n",($100$-(G+D))) and empty}; 
 
{format("*********** Related Database Procedure *****************\n\n") and 
List(HH,|H|) and HH=[] and  for i<|H| do { 
 if H[i][1] ='b'  then {{SearchProcedure(X,H[i][2],i) and stable(HH)}; 
   {if X~=[] then HH:=HH+[X] else HH:=HH and skip}} 
           else {skip and HH:=HH}}}; 
{stable(HH) and for i<|HH| do { if HH[i][2]=HH[|HH|-1][2]  then{ format (" 
[%t,%t,%t] \n",H[HH[i][0]][0],H[HH[i][0]][2],H[HH[i][0]][3]) and skip}} }}}}. 
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Testing functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used to simulate the checking model with files that consist of various 
types of attacks. it is also used to check a safe input.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This function is used to simulate a behavioural function with input samples to find 
related attacks. 
  /* run */ define TestCheckingModel() = { 
 exists X,S,H:{ 
  {set outfile="stdout" and set infile="Piggyback" and  
          list(H,0) and input X and 
                while (X ~= 0) 
                    do {extend_list(H,X) and skip and next input X}}; 
{stable(H) and  for i<|H| do {{CheckingModel(S,H[i][1])}; 
{skip and if S = H[i][0] 
then{ format("Number %d done %t :  %t \n",i+1,S,H[i][1])} 
 else {format("Conflict : Number %d is %t  Expecting %t for: %t 
\n",i+1,S,H[i][1],H[i][0])}  }}}}}. 
/* run */ define TestCheckingRelted () = { 
 exists X,S,H,BehaviourArray:{ 
    list(BehaviourArray,0) and   
    {set outfile="stdout" and set infile="behaviour" and  
     list(H,0) and input X and 
     while (X ~= 0) do {extend_list(H,X) and skip and next input X  }}; 
    {stable(H) and BehaviourArray=[] and 
     for i<|H| do {{CheckingModel(S,H[i][1]) and stable(BehaviourArray) }; 
      {stable(S) and  
   if S = H[i][3] 
  then{ format("Number %d done %t :  %t \n",i+1,S,H[i][1])} 
       else {format("Conflict : Number %d is %t  Expecting %t for: %t 
\n",i+1,S,H[i][1],H[i][3])}  
   and extend_list(BehaviourArray,[H[i][0]]+[S]+[H[i][1]]+[H[i][2]])  
       and skip }}}; 
{stable(H) and  format ("\n \n") and stable(BehaviourArray) and 
BuildBehaviour(BehaviourArray)} }}. 
